By 1640 the West India Company was faced with increasing pressure from the merchants of Amsterdam, the shareholders in the chambers, and the government to abandon its trade monopoly throughout the chartered territory. The revised version of the “Articles and Conditions” had been approved by the States General in January 1639, and with its approval disappeared the last vestige of Company monopoly. Amsterdam merchants were the ones to benefit most from this change in policy, for they had been largely responsible for the development of a regular shipping and distribution system for New Netherland furs, tobacco, and timber. They held a decided advantage as the age of free trade dawned in the colony. Although the mighty Company could still proclaim itself the largest joint-stock company operating in the western hemisphere, it could no longer outfit fleets, pay its employees or supply its colonists. The private merchants of Amsterdam, on the other hand, were eager to take up the transatlantic trade once the cumbersome regulations governing the Company’s monopoly had been removed.

These merchants appear to have been successful in exploiting their advantages. Chart no. 1 below shows the number of sailings to New Netherland from the port of Amsterdam for the years 1645–1664. If periodic disruptions of the trade caused by war conditions between the United Provinces and Great Britain are accounted for, the trade between the fatherland and New Netherland appears to have grown steadily after 1645. Moreover, in the last years before the English conquest, the transatlantic exchange of commodities appears to have been increasing in volume. This increase may have been an upsurge in trade fostered by improved market conditions for New Netherland products in Europe and a dramatic increase in the colony’s population, brought on largely through immigration. The latter phenomenon is documented by the shipping records preserved in the notarial archives of the city of Amsterdam. It appears that the growth in trade volume paralleled that of immigration. Many of the ships docking at New Amsterdam in these years were filled with men, women, and children. Below decks they usually carried a bounty of liquor, guns, and cloth goods for the fur trade. A good deal is to be learned from a closer examination of this movement of trade goods and people.

In chart 2 the sailings are arranged to show the percentage of the total shipping controlled by the four most active Amsterdam merchants. Through a variety of financial instruments, including ship charters, bottomry bonds, and rental agreements for ship space, these merchants came to control many of the voyages in which they invested. The relationship between Amsterdam merchants and the colony of New Netherland has no parallel in American colonial history. It is this relationship, formed out of economic motives, but having the qualities of an apparent collusion of self-interest, which has much to tell us of the history of New Netherland. Some conclusions and speculations may be drawn from an analysis of the information provided in charts 1 & 2.

One obvious conclusion is that during the last fifteen years of New Netherland’s existence four trading firms, operating almost exclusively out of Amsterdam, came to play an important role in the commerce between the colony and the fatherland. The role was clearly not one of monopoly or even oligopoly since every time the total number of ships increased, the percentage controlled by the four merchants declined. In lean years, conversely, when war preparations drove up insurance premiums and the risks of financial ruin were on the rise, the four merchants dominated the trade—controlling 50% or more of the trade in twelve of the fifteen years charted. This fact would seem to suggest that the four Amsterdam merchant firms were the steady and reliable New Netherland trade specialists. They were not chased out when conditions deteriorated, nor did they surrender to the temptation to overexpand in boom times. Between 1640 and 1664 the merchants participating in the chartering, outfitting, and freighting of trade ships acquired the experience necessary to make the trade pay. Other merchants were less directly involved in the trade but were active in developing warehouses and hiring factors.
Chart 1
ANNUAL SAILINGS TO NEW NETHERLAND
1645-1664

Year

Number of ships

Chart 2
ANNUAL PERCENTAGES OF SHIPPING TO NEW NETHERLAND
CONTROLLED BY FOUR MOST ACTIVE TRADE FIRMS

Percentage

Year

Fig. 47. Charts by author on shipping to New Netherland.
By 1664 many of these merchants had become partners in the four firms operating out of Amsterdam. As partners in each others’ businesses and as private entrepreneurs, the merchants of Amsterdam successfully enveloped the New Netherland trade within a web of personal obligations, ad hoc partnerships, and long-term cartel agreements.

In theory all traders with licenses from the West India Company were free to trade with New Netherland under the regulations of 1639. In practice, however, only larger firms could afford to cut profit margins by underselling their rivals, monopolizing shipping, and buying out would-be competitors. The risks of transatlantic trade, moreover, encouraged adequately capitalized, long-term trade relationships to withstand the periodic losses incurred in shipwrecks, and other disasters. The four merchant firms that came to play such an important role in New Netherland’s commercial life were Gillis and Seth Verbrugge, Dirck and Abel de Wolff, Kiliaen and Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer, and Gillis van Hoornbeeck and Associates.

The Verbrugge Company, founded originally as a father-son partnership in the early 1640s to exploit the New Netherland and Virginia trade, was one of the first to prosper in the period of free trade following the abandonment of the West India Company monopoly. In the twenty-three years between the founding of the Verbrugge partnership in 1641 and the fall of New Netherland in 1664, Gillis and his son Seth charted, owned, or invested heavily in some twenty-seven voyages to New Netherland and about fourteen voyages to English Virginia. By the mid-1650s the Verbrugges were also actively engaged in sponsoring American voyages with the other important Amsterdam merchants. Since none of Gillis Verbrugge’s personal records have survived, what little is known of the family’s personal life comes from Seth Verbrugge’s wills preserved in the notarial archives of the city of Amsterdam.

Over the years, Seth drew up three wills before Amsterdam notaries. These wills and the various codicils chronicled his personal fortunes and those of his family. The first will, filed in 1650, left his sizable estate to his wife Catharina and their four children, three sons and a daughter: Johannes, Gillis, Seth, and Anneken. The will bequeathed to Catharina the family townhouse in Amsterdam and all of its furnishings. In addition, Seth’s profits from several voyages to New Netherland and English Virginia were included as assets in the estate. In 1654 Seth Verbrugge drew up another will. Seth’s life had undergone some wrenching changes. Catharina had died in 1653, and the thirty-eight year old widower had remarried within the year. His new wife was the wealthy widow, Maria Wijckenburch, a native of Amsterdam and the daughter one of the most successful merchant wholesalers in the city. Maria had two children by her previous marriage, and she brought not only wealth but political connections with her when she wed Seth Verbrugge. Seth was now connected by marriage to Maria’s uncle, Edward Dill, the auctioneer for the Amsterdam board of admiralty. Seth may have exploited this family tie by soliciting information about confiscated vessels. Several Verbrugge ships were purchased at auction from the Amsterdam admiralty. The last will, drawn up in 1657, listed several other enterprises, including a number of partnerships with the De Wolff and Van Hoornbeeck firms for the exploitation of New Netherland.

Although little is known of the private lives of Gillis and Seth Verbrugge, the material available for their business activities is extensive. Until the mid-1650s Gillis and Seth participated in the New Netherland and Virginia trades by chartering ships for single annual voyages. In these first years, the Verbrugges sought to keep their business dealings with North America on a cash-and-carry basis, and the notarial records suggest that they were successful in doing so. Bottomry bonds were paid on time and insurance premiums were kept up. These first contacts with New Netherland were made through trade partnerships with other Amsterdam merchants, some of whom provided short-term capital loans in return for a percentage of the return cargo.

The 1650s brought changes to the trade. The passage of the English Navigation Act in 1651 and the subsequent war with England drove up the costs of the North Atlantic trade, although prices for New Netherland furs also rose when the risk of maritime trade decreased the supply. The Verbrugges were forced to seek partnerships of longer duration. They were also forced to reassess the risks of the direct Amsterdam–Virginia trade.

The success of operations in New Netherland and the increasing difficulties created by the English Navigation Acts forced the Verbrugges to abandon the direct Amsterdam–Virginia trade in 1656. Relying, instead, on English merchants, many of them possessing dual citizenship as Virginians and New Netherlanders, the
Verbrugges were able to maintain a coastal trade with Virginia which employed a small fleet of coastal sloops built especially to bring "Virginia leaves" to New Amsterdam.10

Having concentrated the bulk of their capital on the New Netherland trade, the Verbrugges suffered more than most when the Anglo-Dutch war threatened the sea lanes between the fatherland and the colony. The cost of marine insurance alone was enough to make some merchants chance the crossing without it and others to abandon the trade totally.11 The notarial records suggest that the number of merchants participating in the New Netherland trade declined steadily after 1651. Charter contracts for ships and bottomry loan applications bear fewer and fewer signatures after 1651, which indicates that the increased risks of maritime trade may have driven out the smaller merchants or forced them into silent partnership arrangements with the four largest Amsterdam firms. The Verbrugges were especially vulnerable because their enterprises were concentrated in New Netherland and tied up in land, ships (sitting idle), and warehouse space. In 1662, when rumors of another war with England were rife, the Verbrugges were forced to sell most of their New Netherland assets to meet the demands of their creditors for cash. Interestingly, but not coincidentally, the syndicate of merchants, authorized by notarized power-of-attorney to supervise the sale of the Verbrugge properties in New Netherland, was headed by two other important New Netherland traders, Abel de Wolff and Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer, son of the patron.12

Abel de Wolff had entered the New Netherland trade when his father, Dirck de Wolff, invested in a number of New Netherland voyages in the 1650s, and by the decade of the 1660s the De Wolff family enterprise was one of the four largest dealing with the colony.13 The founder of the family enterprise, Dirck de Wolff, displayed his prosperity by building a spacious townhouse on the exclusive Heerengracht (literally, gentlemen's canal) and purchasing sixty acres of land in the countryside between Haarlem and Amsterdam. For his five children by Grietje Engberts, he provided the best education available. His two sons Abel (born 1636) and Hendrick (born 1646) received generous support from their father. Abel, as heir to the family business, was to be trained as a merchant. Hendrick, the scholar of the family, received money from his father to support theological studies at the University of Utrecht, where he eventually took his degree.14 The daughters, Geertruyd (born 1637), Trijntje (born 1639), and Judith (born 1643), received the usual high standard of education for Dutch girls, each completing primary school and some secondary school. Geertruyd was especially keen to participate in the family business, and Dirck employed her on a regular basis in the business.

Indeed, it was Geertruyd Verbrugge's marriage to Gerrit Jansz Cuyper that marked the beginning of the De Wolff involvement with New Netherland. Gerrit Jansz Cuyper had engaged in the New Netherland trade for some years. As both an agent for Amsterdam merchants and as a private trader, Cuyper had acquired a first-hand knowledge of the trade. He had worked for the Verbrugges in the late 1640s as an Indian trader and for Jan Hendricksz Sijbingh, a large textile wholesaler who supplied cloth for the fur trade, as an agent. Sijbingh was a longtime business associate of Dirck de Wolff and may have introduced Cuyper to the family.15

The opportunity to participate in the New Netherland trade came when Dirck, in partnership with his eldest son Abel and Gerrit Jansz Cuyper, organized a company to trade with the colony. Dirck provided the capital and perhaps important connections in the Amsterdam merchant community, while Abel handled the management of the company in Amsterdam and Cuyper directed the operation in New Netherland. Dirck's new business interest meant the loss of his favorite daughter, Geertruyd, who sailed to the colony with her husband. In its first year of operation the company developed a distribution system for furs, timber, and tobacco. Colonial products were assembled by Cuyper in New Netherland each year and sold for profit in Amsterdam by Abel de Wolff. By all accounts the small company was persistently profitable.

In contrast to the Verbrugges' effort in New Netherland, the De Wolff investments tended to concentrate on single projects rather than on numerous trading voyages. The chartering of ships and the outfitting of trade expeditions, for example, occupied a a smaller percentage of the family's capital. Whereas the Verbrugge family had invested an average of 80 percent of their resources in ships, cargos, and warehouses, the De Wolff investments in such things never exceeded 60 Percent. The family's total capital investment in New Netherland remained much more liquid, being tied primarily to the salaries of agents in the colony and the rentals of cargo space aboard ships belonging to others.16 Moreover, the De Wolff business interests were generally more diversified than
the Verbrugges. With money invested in Baltic grain, French wine, and West African slaves, the family was protected against the type of financial trouble that had cost the Verbrugges their once dominant position in the New Netherland trade. The De Wolff strategy paid dividends. The De Wolffs chose to exploit New Netherland by developing the colonial market for provisions. The carrying trade continued to be the most lucrative of the family’s long-term investments, but the essential thrust of the De Wolff business was the establishment of a commercial presence in New Netherland that could serve as a distribution system for manufactured goods and a conduit for furs, timber, and tobacco.

Abel de Wolff was 28 years old when he took over the management of his father’s business in New Netherland. He had earned his job with years of work in Amsterdam as the broker for the family company, and he had bought a share in the business with money he earned in the New Netherland trade. His personal investment included £2,000 from his own pocket, and £4,000 of his inheritance pledged by Dirck de Wolff as his son’s wedding portion. Abel had already demonstrated an enterprising spirit in investment schemes with Gillis van Hoornbeeck and Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer. Just four years before, acting on his own and investing his own money, Abel de Wolff had shipped a cargo of trade goods to New Netherland aboard a large ship chartered by Gillis van Hoornbeeck. The voyage turned out to be a financial success, contributing to Abel’s private fortune and convincing the young merchant that his future lay in the development of New Netherland. In 1661 and again in 1662 Abel de Wolff joined Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer as an equal partner in the outfitting of the Hoop for two trading voyages to New Netherland. These voyages also turned a profit. At the close of 1662 the partnership’s warehouse in Amsterdam was filled with tobacco and furs. The next year witnessed Abel de Wolff back in partnership with his brother-in-law, Gerrit Jansz Cuyper and Jan Baptist van Rensselaer. This partnership, one of the last formed during the period of Dutch rule, completed one trading voyage in 1664. The voyage of the Eendracht, although extended by the circumnavigation of Scotland to avoid English warships, returned a profit for its investors.

When Abel de Wolff took over the family business in New Netherland in 1664, over £7,000 worth of goods awaited shipment to Holland at New Amsterdam. In addition, the family owned a house and a few parcels of land on Manhattan Island. Under the terms of the bond signed by Abel de Wolff on the occasion of assuming direction of the trade, he was given perpetual use of the house on Manhattan and the lands surrounding it for an annual rent of £120. Dirck de Wolff retained the title to the property. Everything seemed in place for a major expansion of the family’s enterprise in New Netherland when news of the colony’s surrender reached Amsterdam. One can only imagine the effect the news must have had on the family. Abel’s dreams were shattered. Dirck’s hopes for his family’s fortune and his son’s career were threatened. Just a year before, Dirck had invested his daughters £8,000 dowries in the New Netherland trade, perhaps as a gesture of family confidence in his son, perhaps out of an enthusiasm for the trade which had lately proven lucrative. In any event, Abel’s two unmarried sisters, Judith and Trijntje, had reason to be anxious as the family waited news from America.

The fall of New Netherland was a catastrophe for the Amsterdam merchants. It not only spelled the end of a half-century effort to make New Netherland a success, but by means of the English Navigation Acts it separated the Dutch merchant suppliers from their clients, employees, and customers. From New England to the southern boundaries of Virginia the North American seaboard was English. The Amsterdam merchants, Abel de Wolff and his anxious family among them, could only wait to see what they could salvage from the situation.

English authorities attempted to curtail Dutch trade immediately, and in their zeal to anglicize the colony’s trade everyone suffered. Without the continued shipping of the private merchants of Amsterdam the commercial position of New Netherland, now New York, declined rapidly. Both the Dutch and English colonists bore the brunt of the economic collapse. In 1667, the new English governor, Colonel Francis Lovelace, ordered special passports to be drawn up, permitting Dutch merchants to send three ships a year to New York. The merchants were required to pay high fees to the Duke of York’s agents for these passports, and to make matters worse the West India Company continued to collect its licensing fees even though it had lost the colony three years before. The result was that the increased costs of the trade fell heavily on the Amsterdam merchants.

In 1668, Abel de Wolff requested a four-year audit of the accounts in New York from the company’s new factor, Harmen Vedder. The audit turned out to be a staggering tale of decline. In the four years preceding 1668 no profits were recorded. An investment of £4,400
by Vedder was not recoverable, and the house and farm on Manhattan Island had to be sold to pay debts. The company's entire cash reserve in New York amounted to less than $3,700. An inventory of furs and tobacco was valued at less than $800. From an annual profit of 50% in the 1650s the New Netherland–New York trade had ceased to be profitable for Amsterdam merchants.

The De Wolff family continued to trade with New York under a series of agreements which permitted the shipment of goods via England to America. One such agreement in 1670 involved Abel de Wolff in a syndicate of English, Dutch, and New York merchants. The complex financial arrangements for the chartering of the English ship, Duke of York, suggested the extreme measures taken in these years to circumvent the provisions of the Navigation Acts.

The Duke of York was captained by Johannes Luyck, a Hollander by birth but a naturalized English subject living in New York. The ship was registered as English, but chartered in Amsterdam. Several documents were notarized testifying to the fact that the trade expedition was essentially an English undertaking in complete compliance with the Navigation Acts; yet the sponsors of the voyage and the beneficiaries of the marine insurance policy were all Dutch. And finally, Abel de Wolff gave personal testimony before an Amsterdam notary which confirmed that the voyage of the Duke of York was “not subject to confiscation for violations of the English Navigation Act.”

Even these complicated arrangements could not make the voyage profitable. When the Duke of York returned to London after an uneventful voyage, a flurry of legal questions tied up the sale of her cargo and forced the Dutch merchants to declare the enterprise a loss. Abel de Wolff could no longer count on profits from the trade with North America. He had overestimated the profits from furs and tobacco and in anticipation of a good voyage had borrowed heavily to pay the English fees. When his portion of the cargo was finally sold in Amsterdam some months later, the sale could not begin to pay the loans.

By 1675 Abel de Wolff was no longer seriously involved in the New York trade, but his reluctant withdrawal from the trade did not end the family's connection with the former Dutch colony. Gerrit Jansz Cuyper, husband to Geertruyd de Wolff and Abel’s longtime partner continued to participate in the New York trade until his death in 1679. As a naturalized citizen of the colony of New York, he co-sponsored the voyages of the Rebecca in 1677 and 1678 under the command of the Englishman, Thomas Williams. This partnership with English merchants was soon dissolved when Cuyper could not meet his financial obligations, but he maintained his partnership with the Dutch textile wholesaler, Jan Hendricksz Sijbingh. With Sijbingh he continued to import Dutch cloth goods from Amsterdam. Some profits must have been forthcoming in this trade because after Gerrit’s death his son, Jan Gerritz de Wolff Cuyper, took over the cloth trade; as late as 1683 he was still conducting business with former customers of the De Wolff company.

The Van Rensselaers of Amsterdam developed by far the most complex commercial relationship with New Netherland. It was an old family, wealthy and genteel, steeped in tradition. The men in the family had become merchants in the late sixteenth century, and in the seventeenth the family was among the most respected merchant families in Amsterdam.

Kiliaen van Rensselaer was born at Hasselt in the Netherlands about 1580; the only son of Hendrik van Rensselaer and Maria Pasraat. He had one sister, Maria, who married Ryckaert van Twiller, father of Wouter van Twiller, a future director-general of New Netherland. His mother, Maria Pasraat, was the daughter of one of the Pasraat Brothers, a famous printing firm in Deventer. The untimely death of Hendrik van Rensselaer and the uncertain conditions of war forced Maria to make an important decision about her son’s future. She decided to send the young man to Amsterdam to learn the jewelry trade from his uncle, Wolfert van Bijler.

In Amsterdam Kiliaen’s natural talents for business were soon evident, and Van Bijler developed a confidence in his nephew. As the firm's agent to the royal courts east of the Rhine, Kiliaen had the opportunity to travel throughout Europe, from Budapest to Paris and from Rome to Copenhagen. Having assumed control of Van Bijler's business in 1609, he ran it profitably for five years before selling out to the larger firm of Jan van Wely, one of the wealthiest and most successful of Amsterdam’s many jewelers. As a junior partner, Kiliaen had little say in the decisions of the company, but his talents soon found expression when Van Wely appointed him chief officer of the company with the responsibility of keeping the books. Kiliaen held this job for six years. It was during this period that the future patroon took a
wife. He married Hillegond van Bijler, niece of his former patron and his own cousin.

Hillegond's dowry was just over f12,000 and Kiliaen quickly found a use for the money. In 1615, he bought two lots along the recently completed Keizersgracht (emperor's canal) on which he commenced construction on a house for his bride. The new home was a stately townhouse in the most fashionable area of the city. In less than a decade after arriving in Amsterdam, Kiliaen van Rensselaer had risen from a jeweler's apprentice (living in cramped quarters on the Oudezijds Voorburgwal, the old side of the city wall) to an independent merchant with a townhouse on the Keizersgracht. For a thirty-five year old newcomer to Amsterdam the future appeared bright indeed.

Kiliaen van Rensselaer's initial investment in the West India Company was a substantial one. That it was at least f6,000 is proved by the fact that he was designated a principal shareholder (hoofdparficipant) in the Amsterdam chamber. As a principal shareholder, Van Rensselaer enjoyed many privileges and much authority. One of the most important powers held by the principal shareholders was the right to vote for the chamber's directors. Kiliaen not only voted for the directors, he became one himself when a vacancy occurred on the board in 1625. As a director he was eligible to sit on any of the chamber's commissions; he chose the one established to make policy recommendations for New Netherland.

Van Rensselaer's impassioned advocacy of the patroonship plans of 1628 and 1629 earned him many enemies on the commission and within the chamber.26 As a patroon he found himself in a difficult position. Every time he complained of Company intransigence in fulfilling the obligations undertaken in the Freedoms and Exemptions he was accused by his enemies of trying to ruin the Company for his own profit.

Less than a year after the death of Hillegond and in the midst of the controversy over the drafting of the Freedoms and Exemptions, Kiliaen van Rensselaer married Anna van Wely, daughter of his former partner. Anna was rich and wise in financial affairs. Before stepping to the altar, she had a pre-nuptial agreement prepared before an Amsterdam notary. The agreement specified that her personal fortune could be used by her husband during his lifetime, but for all legal purposes the personal property both chattel and real would remain forever in her name. It was a fortunate match for Van Rensselaer. Anna's wealth was now added to his own considerable fortune just at the time when his plans for establishing Rensselaerswyck demanded large capital outlays.

As Kiliaen's fortune grew so did his ambitions. In the 1620s he participated in several reclamation projects (droogmakerijen) which sought to recover land along the southwestern shore of the Zuider Zee just south of Amsterdam. In 1628 he purchased land near Huizen for a country home. Moreover, he continued in the jewel trade, and his responsibilities as an officer of the West India Company increased with each passing year. But the project that consumed him from 1629 until his death in 1643 was the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. In the wilderness of New Netherland Kiliaen found an outlet for his restless talents.

Van Rensselaer's role as patroon of Rensselaerswyck has been explained by others, but his role as a private merchant engaged in the colonial provision, fur, timber, and tobacco trades has not been as fully examined.27 Van Rensselaer's interests in New Netherland differed markedly from that of the other Amsterdam merchants. As a patroon, Kiliaen's responsibilities were more territorial than commercial. Saddled with the problems of populating the upper Hudson River region while simultaneously jockeying with his enemies on the New Netherland Commission to acquire Company compliance with its pledges, Van Rensselaer and his heirs were forced to develop a complex mercantile relationship with the colony.

As the fortunes of the West India Company waned, the Amsterdam chamber looked to the private merchants for supplies and shipping. In the late 1630s the firms of Gillis and Seth Verbrugge and Dirck and Abel de Wolff were active in the New Netherland trade. By 1640, Kiliaen van Rensselaer also began to tap the provisioning trade as the first flood tide of immigration surged. As the patroon of Rensselaerswyck he knew from past experience that his colony on the Hudson River would play a key part in any scheme to provision New Netherland from America. He also considered the possibility of Rensselaerswyck becoming a grain exporting colony which could supply the Company's slaves in Brazil in exchange for sugar.28 Likewise, he must have been aware that his colony could serve as an excellent base for a continuous transatlantic trade in furs and supplies, if the Company monopoly were ever broken. Thus, when the decade of the forties
opened with the announcement of the scrapping of the Company monopoly, Van Rensselaer was prepared to become a major merchant trader. Van Rensselaer was not a newcomer to the private shipping business. In the 1630s he had been frustrated in his efforts to supply his colonists by the West India Company’s refusal to rent him space aboard its ships. In desperation, he contracted a shipwright to build his own vessel, the 60-ton Rensselaerswijck. The enterprise had two principal goals: to carry some twenty families to the colony of Rensselaerswijck, and to trade for furs and tobacco along the coast of North America. A one-tenth share in the venture was sold to the Varlet brothers of Amsterdam (furriers) for $1,200. Other shares, comprising nearly fifty percent of the ship’s total insured worth, were sold before she sailed to the colony.29

As a wealthy Amsterdam merchant with influential connections, Kiliaen had access to information on ships, low cost loans on bottomry, and supplies. His position as patron also allowed him to take advantage of his built-in colonial market at Rensselaerswijck, where warehouses were already built and a colonial distribution center functioned. The financial arrangements required to make the trade profitable encouraged cooperation among the major suppliers of New Netherland and brought all four of the most active Amsterdam traders into contact—indeed collusion might be a better word.

In the voyages of the Aker (1639 and 1641), the Wapen van Noorwegen (1639), the Wapen van Leeuwarden (1640), and the Coninck David (1641 and 1642–43) Van Rensselaer had sufficient shares to be named the owner (eigenaer) on all notarial records referring to these vessels. In other voyages during this same period his financial investment was too small to be accounted as ownership, but on at least two large ships, the Engel Gabriel and the Eijkenboom, Van Rensselaer’s portion of the operating capital entitled him to be designated as a principal freighter (hoofdbevrachter). That he participated in other voyages in this period is almost certain. The notarial records of the Verbrugge and De Wolff enterprises referred to a “notable merchant in Amsterdam, lord over vast lands in America” as being one of the partners in voyages to Virginia and New Netherland. Such ventures were important undertakings for the patron, and his son was no less enthusiastic about the profits to be made in shipping to New Netherland.30

Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer, eldest son of Kiliaen’s marriage to Anna van Wely, was too young at his father’s death in 1643 to assume leadership in the family’s affairs. He had to watch instead as his half brother, Johannes (son of Kiliaen and Hillegond van Bijler), managed the Van Rensselaer fortune. Johannes was apparently not well suited for the role of patroon. He had no love for Rensselaerswijck, and certainly no commitment to make it succeed. Richaert van Rensselaer, younger brother of Jan Baptiste and half brother to Johannes, described Johannes’ attitude toward his New Netherland manor to his brother. “The patroon,” wrote Richaert in 1658, “does not even give it [Rensselaerswijck] a thought.”31 In fact, the patroon had given the colony some thought. He had thought enough about it to turn its affairs over to his alcoholic uncle, former director-general Wouter van Twiller. In 1631, Jan Baptiste could no longer watch Johannes destroy his inheritance; he took ship for New Netherland to take over the affairs of Rensselaerswijck personally.

On arrival in New Netherland Jan Baptiste was astonished and dismayed to find that the patroonship was failing. Tenants were leaving or failing to work. Crops were unplanted, and the inept hand of Wouter van Twiller was everywhere to be seen. The ruinous condition of the family’s inheritance in New Netherland prompted Jan Baptiste to request that his younger brother, Jeremias, come to America to assist him in bringing order out of the chaos he confronted. Jan Baptiste and his brother were to work together for four years in New Netherland. The colonial experience convinced Jan Baptiste that profits were possible in the private shipping and provisioning trade. When he returned to Amsterdam in 1658 he undertook to channel the family’s fortune into shipping and trade.

In partnership with his uncles and brothers, Jan Baptiste chartered and outfitted no less than six ships for the New Netherland trade between 1659 and 1664. These years also witnessed the Van Rensselaers in partnership with the other large New Netherland traders. With Abel de Wolff and Gerrit Zuyck (executor of the Verbrugge company) he pooled capital for the purchase of ships, the hiring of crews, and the obtaining of trade goods. In each of these enterprises he had a substantial investment and was designated an owner or a principal freighter. Even after the English conquest, he continued to invest in shipping companies organized for the New York–Amsterdam trade. As late as 1671 records show Jan Baptiste investing $23,000 in one ship “to trade with English northern Virginia, called lately by us New Netherland.”32
Fig. 48. Totius Neobelgii, by R. & J. Ottens, 1673, based on the 1655 Visscher map. Courtesy of Manuscripts and Special Collections, New York State Library, Albany. Photo by Craig Williams.
The family remained deeply involved in the commercial affairs of the colony. Their territorial holdings alone guaranteed a continuing concern over the colony’s future. It would take another Anglo-Dutch war, a second conquest of New York, and a warrant from the Duke of York to finally legitimize the Van Rensselaer claim to Rensselaerswyck. That legitimation secured the Van Rensselaers within the developing English mercantile system. As “naturalized” citizens of His Britannic Majesty’s empire, the Van Rensselaers’ commercial enterprises were protected by the same Navigation Acts that had rendered the continuation of the New York Amsterdam trade too expensive for Abel de Wolff.

A frequent partner of the Van Rensselaers in the last years was Gillis van Hoornbeeck. Van Hoornbeeck first appears in the notarial documents in 1636. In the eight years preceding the English conquest, however, this latecomer to the New Netherland trade was as active in exploiting the trade as the De Wolfs and Van Rensselaers. As a shipowner, financier, freighter, insurance broker, and retail fur distributor, Gillis van Hoornbeeck ranked second only to Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer among the Amsterdam merchants specializing in the New Netherland trade. Gillis van Hoornbeeck came from a family considerably less genteel than the Van Rensselaers. His father, Tobias van Hoombeeck, had been a Haarlem salt refiner, vinegar distiller, and local merchant. When he died in 1637, the estate was assessed at f8,560 and the family home and all of its furnishings at f7,700. This modest estate had to support a wife and four children.

Gillis was raised by his mother and half-brother, Hercules van Hoornbeeck (son of Tobias and Maria Herculesdochter Schatters of Haarlem). Gillis was to display a strong sense of familial responsibility throughout his life. He married Maria Wijs in 1654. A poor girl without a dowry, she had lived with her widowed mother on the Achterburgwal in Amsterdam’s working class neighborhood. The marriage was a love match which lasted for twelve years, during which Maria gave birth to two children. She died a young woman as a result of complications attending her third pregnancy. Her death was a devastating blow for Gillis, who liquidated his business affairs in Amsterdam and returned with his two children to Haarlem. He spent a year in Haarlem before finally shaking himself free of the grief. He never remarried. Van Hoornbeeck was an active member of the Reformed Congregation of Amsterdam.

In 1661 he served as a deacon and an investment counselor for the congregation. He also served as a financial advisor to other congregations, notably the Flemish Baptist Congregation of Amsterdam (Vlaamse Doopsgezinde Gemeente van Amsterdam). For both churches he advised investment in the New Netherland trade.

Van Hoornbeeck’s first involvement in the New Netherland trade came when he formed a private shipping company with two other Amsterdam merchants. The company was chartered for four years to trade with New Netherland under license from the West India Company. This company proved so successful that it was re-chartered in 1660 and again in 1664. It did not cease operations until 1666. This was the same year in which the Verbrugge company finally went bankrupt, leaving the other New Netherland trade specialists holding loans and bottomry bonds on Verbrugge assets. The executors of the Verbrugge estate (both Gillis and Seth Verbrugge had died in 1663) appointed Gillis van Hoornbeeck and Gerrit Zuyck to the probate arbitration board whose task it was to sort out the various claims on the estate and recommend measures to bring solvency back to the company. Zuyck’s appointment was hardly unexpected, since he had taken over Verbrugge operations in the late 1650s when he offered Gillis Verbrugge a way out of his financial problems by buying out more than half of the company’s shares. Van Hoornbeeck’s appointment to the board after only ten years in the trade is more surprising. It appears that Gillis van Hoornbeeck obtained his seat on the arbitration board because he was the Verbrugges’ largest creditor and because no less a person than Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer had supported his appointment. In 1668 Van Hoornbeeck joined with the other “great traders” of New Netherland to form a company to trade with New York.

The new company aimed at developing a long term market for Dutch merchants in English New York. To avoid the strictures of the English Navigation system the three partners, Van Hoornbeeck, Van Rensselaer, and De Wolff, purchased passports issued by the Duke of York. The passports were acquired through the company’s two New York agents, former director-general Petrus Stuyvesant and Cornelis Steenwijck. The operating capital, set initially at just f6,000, was to be increased as the needs of the trade arose. The company shares were divided into fifths with each partner receiving twenty percent of the profits in return for twenty percent of the capital. Jan Baptiste van Rensselaer was made operations
officer (hoofdbewinthebber—literally chief director) for the company’s first voyage; Van Hoombeeck served as operations officer for the second.  

The company sent three ships to New York: the Posthoorn, Juffrouw Leonora, and Nieuw Jorck, undoubtedly a Dutch phonetic spelling for the English ship, New York. Only the Juffrouw Leonora was a Dutch ship, the other two were chartered English ships, manned by English crews and skippered by English captains in accordance with the Navigation Acts. The three ships were loaded at Amsterdam with trade goods, passengers, and some livestock. The cargo of the Posthoorn, for which a number of insurance policies have survived, was assessed at £15,000. Notwithstanding the careful measures taken by the partners, the company failed to live up to expectations. One year of operations nearly bankrupted the firm, and in 1669 the company was dissolved with the mutual consent of all partners. The costs of outfitting and freighting two ships and the building of a third had proven more expensive than the partners had expected, but the real cause of the company’s failure was the costs of trading legally as foreigners in the English navigation system. The sheer inefficiency of the administration of the system made it pointless to attempt to comply with its provisions. The passports issued to the company by representatives of the Duke of York and paid for with specie were never made official, or so His Majesty’s customs agents would claim when they confiscated the return cargos of all three vessels. The Amsterdam notarial records chronicle a long legal dispute between the Dutch merchants and the English government. The result, after years of legal wrangling, was a decision by an arbitration board which awarded the Dutch partners less than five percent on their investment.

By 1670 the increased costs of trading legally within the English navigation system had proved too great for the trade to bear. The four Amsterdam merchants had failed individually and collectively to maintain the profits of the pre-1664 period. Only the Van Rensselaers with their unique status as patroons could continue to engage profitably in the transatlantic trade. The others were forced to abandon the trade altogether or pursue it on a much smaller scale through London merchants. The four Amsterdam merchant families just described were not competitors. They were, instead, the constituent parts of a collective effort to exploit the free trade provisions of the revised West India Company charter after 1639. Indeed, the Amsterdam merchants were able to keep the colony’s sometimes tenuous lifeline with the United Provinces open even in the face of Company bankruptcy, maritime war, and national indifference. That they did so with profits in mind should only serve to prove that the four Amsterdam merchant families were typical of a Dutch merchant class whose profit-mindedness was legendary in the seventeenth century.

One feature which appears to stand out in the Dutch mercantile relationship with New Netherland is the amount of financial control exercised by the Amsterdam merchants. The Amsterdam-based, New Netherland trade specialists were reluctant to permit control of the trade to slip from their grasp. Having vied so long with the West India Company for their rights, they were unwilling to allow their factors in the colony a free hand in setting prices or determining the percentage of trade goods needed to support the trade. Bearing most of the risks of the transatlantic trade, the Amsterdam merchants expected and grasped its responsibilities. The result was a form of colonialism that depended on financial power rather than government restrictions.

In the 1630s Kiliaen van Rensselaer estimated the cost of shipping supplies to his colony to be roughly fifty percent of the original vendor price in Amsterdam. Several other sources confirm Van Rensselaer’s estimate, including one from the notarial archives which noted that the West India Company store at New Amsterdam was selling shoes in the early 1660s at 140 percent above their wholesale cost in the fatherland. When these estimates are added to the litany of complaints by Company soldiers and returning colonists of the high cost of trade goods and commodities in New Netherland, we begin to see the classic pattern of colonialism.

The population surge in the colony opened up a thriving trade in provisions after 1645, and the surviving cargo lists testify to this. In New Netherland, livestock raising provided an auxiliary income to farming and fur trading for many colonists, and the Amsterdam merchants were among the first to build livestock transports and engage in cattle raising on Manhattan Island. Even former Company officials like ex-director-general, Wouter van Twiller continued to invest in livestock through the merchant houses of Van Rensselaer and Van Hoombeeck long after he had returned to Holland in disgrace.

The cost of European goods to the settlers remained persistently high, since the only transportable specie they
could lay their hands on were furs and tobacco. Cargos returning from New Netherland were frequently made up wholly of furs and tobacco. Thus, the Amsterdam merchants could receive the prized colonial products with almost no expenditures for permanent fur trading factors in the colony. As the middleman for the Amsterdam merchants, the colonist ran all the risks involved in the fur trade, while the Amsterdam merchants benefited from a lucrative colonial secondary trade.

The system was very effective in driving out competition from small home-country merchants, because it required access to supplies and lines of credit simply not available to newcomers. It also encouraged a collusion of capital to limit the liabilities of the trade. Hence, self-interest explains why the De Wolff, Van Rensselaer, and Van Hoornbeeck enterprises so frequently merged in partnerships. Caution and experience, moreover, served these merchants well. Ultimately, it was these characteristics—self-interest, caution, and experience—which led to wise business decisions and resulted in the four Amsterdam merchant firms dominating the transatlantic trade in the years of high risk while holding steady at about 50% of the total trade during periods of lower risk.

Blessed with an abundant fur supply and the Hudson River to carry the furs to market, New Netherland offered lucrative rewards to private traders who could master the intricacies of the transatlantic trade. The numerous attempts by the West India Company to impose monopoly conditions on the trade failed because the private merchants of Amsterdam remained active in the colony’s trade by circumventing the Company regulations blatantly in the 1620s, operating under license from the patroons in the 1630s, or participating as free traders under the expanded trade provisions of 1639. Unlike New England, the individuals largely responsible for exploiting New Netherland’s resources were merchants of the home country. Secure in their Amsterdam counting houses, the merchants grasped control of the colony’s lifeline to Holland and held fast. Profits from their enterprises flowed into coffers in Amsterdam, thus depriving New Netherland of capital and the opportunity to develop a viable, colony-based merchant community. The results of this “secret colonialism” were evident in the 1660s. Nurtured by the free trade policies of the bankrupt West India Company, the private merchants of Amsterdam had succeeded all too well. Their success may have been New Netherland’s undoing.

Notes

1Parts of this article have appeared in my book Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); they are reprinted here by permission of Cornell University Press.

2The revised charter of 1639 represented the final chapter in a decades-long struggle to maintain the Company monopoly. Forced by the States General to relinquish control of the fur trade or risk losing the colony, the directors of the West India Company proposed a set of “Articles and Conditions” which essentially removed Company authority in most economic matters while simultaneously thrusting the Company into politics. After yet another revision in the Articles and Conditions, demanded by the States General, a new set of Freedoms and Exemptions was proclaimed. The new regulations followed the pattern of other joint-stock companies in America, most notably the Virginia Company, in providing free land—200 acres per head of household—to any immigrant who would settle permanently in New Netherland. The incentives worked, and by 1664 there were approximately 9,000 Europeans living in New Netherland, many of whom had arrived in the last 20 years of the colony’s history to take advantage of the new opportunities.

3Data for Chart 1 have come from approximately 300 charter contracts and several hundred bottomry bonds and marine insurance policies in the Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam. The collection of notarial documents is the work of the late Simon Hart, Director of the Archives. Dr. Hart introduced me to this collection and supervised my use of the documents during my year stay in the Netherlands in 1973-74.

4The unusually high number of sailings in 1655 probably reflected the movement of Company soldiers and equipment aboard privately-owned vessels, whereas the large drop in annual sailings between 1647 and 1650 may have echoed higher marine insurance rates in anticipation of war with England. The amazing statistic, however, is that after 1645 no year witnessed less than four sailings from Amsterdam to New Netherland. If the average tonnage is computed to be 250 tons for a transatlantic freighter in
the seventeenth century, the evidence for New Netherland indicates a minimum of 1,000 tons per year for the 1645–1664 period. We must keep in mind, moreover, that many of these ships carried colonists on the outward voyage. For a discussion of cost factors, insurance rates, and average tonnages for Dutch shipping in this period, see: Simon Hart, “The Dutch and North America in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century: Some Aspects,” Mededelingen van de Nederlandse vereniging voor zeegeschiedenis, 20 (March 1970), 5–17.

Various sources have served for Chart 2. The most important of which were the charter contracts in the Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam. Much useful information also turned up in genealogical sources used for the construction of the histories of the four New Netherland-Amsterdam merchant families.

These figures were compiled once again from the notarial archives of the Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam—specifically from the charter contracts and bottomry bonds notarized before Amsterdam notaries. The twenty-seven Virginia voyages were documented by Amsterdam-specifically from the charter contracts and notarial archives of the Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam.

The twenty-seven Virginia voyages were documented by Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1352, October 19, 1654, 82; No. 2139, October 28, 1654, 87; No. 2197, December 18, 1654, 181–83. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1388, February 20, 1650, 10; No. 1393, April 18, 1654, 48 f.v.; No. 1355, June 5, 1657, 83 f.v. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1305, April 27, 1655, 65.

Premiums were rarely less than 10% after 1651, and 12% and more was not uncommon. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1035, October 1648 with notarized addendum in 1664, 491–93 f.v.

The following summary of De Wolff activities is drawn partly from C.H. Jansen, “Geschiedenis van de familie De Wolff: sociale en economische facetten van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden in de zeventiende eeuw,” Jaarboek van het Genootschap Amstelodamum, 56 (1964), 131–55, and from my own research in the Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam. When Hendrick died in 1700, he possessed a private library of more than four hundred volumes, mostly on subjects in theology. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 5460, undated, 308.

On the account books of the textile merchant the De Wolff family stood second only to the Verbrugges as customers. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1305, September 1, 1656, 162 f.v.

The information on percentages of Verbrugge capital invested in the New Netherland trade comes from documents drawn up in 1667 by arbitrators for the bankrupt estate of Gillis and Seth Verbrugge. The most important document arising from the arbitration is an inventory of Verbrugge assets. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2223, Feb. 10, 1667, 258–59. The data for the De Wolff investment percentages are drawn from eleven wills and codicils prepared by Dirck de Wolff in the eight years preceding his death in 1679. These wills and codicils are in Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2367, May 28, 1671, 267; no. 2370, December 22, 1673, 40; no. 2371, October 31, 1674, 60; no. 2371, October 31, 1674, 62 addendum; no. 2371, November 24, 1674, 80; no. 2371, July 20, 1675, 224; no. 2372, June 17, 1676, 214; no. 2372, June 17, 1676, 223 codicil; no. 2372, February 17, 1677, 404; no. 2374, June 6, 1678, 479 f.v.

Jansen, “Geschiedenis van de familie De Wolff,” 136. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2224, December 1663, 32; no. 2444, February 29, 1664, 134–134 f.v.; no. 1518, March 15, 1664, 115; no. 2768, March 26, 1664, 608; no. 3138, April 3, 1664, 31, 33 f.v.–34 f.v.; no. 2769, April 8, 1664, 54–55; no. 2885, April 8, 1664, 155; no. 2769, April 16, 1664, 81–82; no. 2218, January 5, 1665, 49–50; no. 2218, March 7, 1665, 497–98 f.v.; no. 2223, April 27, 1667, 913: no. 2224, May 5, 1667, 32–33.


The Van Rensselaer family has been the subject of much research. For the following summary of the family’s commercial interest in New Netherland I have relied on Arnold J.F. van Laer, The Van Rensselaer–Bowier Manuscripts (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908) and S.G. Nisseson, The Patroon’s Domain (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937).

27 In English, see: Nissenson, Patroon’s Domain and the translation of Nicolaas de Roever’s monograph, "Kiliaen van Rensselaer and His Colony of Rensselaerswyck," in Van Laer, Van Rensselaer–Bowie Manuscripts, 40–85.

28 Van Laer, Van Rensselaer–Bowie Manuscripts, 482.

29 Ibid., 323 and Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1045, August 8, 1636, 120–21 f.v.; no. 414, August 8, 1636, 173; no. 995, September 10, 1636, 578. Secondary accounts of this first Van Rensselaer attempt to engage in the New Netherland trade as a private shipper have appeared in Nissenson, Patroon’s Domain, 69 and 81n, and in J. Spinoza Catella Jessurun, Kiliaen van Rensselaer van 1623 tot 1636 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1917), Appendix XXI. Neither of these accounts, however, made use of the notarial documents of Amsterdam.

30 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1500, May 9, 1640, 13–17; no. 1526, May 6, 1641, 136–37; no. 1526, July 2, 1641, 161; no. 1626, July 4, 1641, unpaginated; no. 1626, July 6, 1641, unpaginated; no. 696, July 8, 1641, 93; no. 524, July 10, 1641, 204 f.v.; no. 1059, July 11, 1641, 116; no. 1501, July 20, 1641, 83–84; no. 1501, November 26, 1641, 165; no. 1059, December 18, 1641, 176–176 f.v.; no. 1285, April 9, 1642, 52; no. 732, May 6, 1642, 571; no. 1336, May 22, 1642, 27; no. 1559, July 24, 1642, 268; no. 732, September 13, 1642, 745.

31 Arnold J.F. van Laer, ed., The Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1932), 118.

32 Ibid., 342 and Van Laer, Van Rensselaer–Bowie Manuscripts, 399–401, 403, 405, 670, 790 and 795.

33 The Van Hoornbeeck genealogy has never been extensively researched. The information for the following account of the family was drawn largely from a “working genealogy” compiled by myself with the assistance of Simon Hart and the gracious staff of the Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam.

34 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Begraafnis register van de Westerkerk van Amsterdam, Jaarboek voor 1659.

35 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Doop, Trouw en Boedel Boeken van Amsterdam. No. 473, May 28, 1654, 232.

36 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2965, June 1661, unpaginated.

37 The company was formed as a shipping concern in 1656. The partners were Lambert Leyssen, merchant of Amsterdam, Simon van Apher “for himself and his unnamed partners,” and Gillis van Hoornbeeck. With Leyssen’s death in 1666 the company was dissolved. Its chief agent in New Netherland was Cornelis Steenwijk. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2895, June 11, 1666, unpaginated.


39 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2784, February 27, 1668, 447–50.

40 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2845, March 3, 1668, 127 f.v.–128; no. 2784, March 26, 1668, 642–43; no. 2784, March 29, 1668, 669–70; no. 2226, April 28, 1668, 994–97 f.v.

41 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2790, August 20, 1669, 663–664 f.v.

42 Van Laer, Van Rensselaer–Bowie Manuscripts, 325–26; and, Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1045, August 8, 1636, 120–21 f.v.

43 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 2855, January 12, 1664, folio 361–62 unpaginated.

44 In 1639 two former West India Company farmers in New Netherland testified that livestock prices in the colony were nearly 100 percent higher than those in Holland. Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1280, May 5, 1639, 60 f.v.–61.

45 Gemeentelijke Archief van Amsterdam, Notarial no. 1332, May 7, 1639, 44 f.v.