The “Hollander Interest” and Ideas about Free Trade in Colonial New York: Persistent Influences of the Dutch, 1664–1764

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In the first years after New Amsterdam’s conquest in 1664, there was very little unanimity about whether, and how, New Yorkers ought to trade with Amsterdam. Despite the swift transfer of power from Dutch to English hands, the two nations confronted each other as long term rivals, each with a different economic trajectory during the seventeenth century. Amsterdam dominated the northern fisheries and Baltic trades; had a strong presence in the New World carrying trades; developed superior shipping, warehousing, credit and banking systems; and showed the visible signs of success in dress, art, and science. In contrast, England entered a phase of economic uncertainty after 1600 in which the Old Draperies declined, inflation and unemployment rose, and trading monopolies held extensive privileges in foreign commerce. English theorists often noted their country’s reliance upon Dutch skills and currency to support its economy.

Together, these and other contrasts between the two countries represented different moments in the separate economic directions they travelled: Amsterdam attained a peak of commercial prosperity in the 1640s to 1690s, while England’s rise would become assured only after the 1690s. Until then, the “Holland trades” were England’s greatest perceived threat, one conceived and maintained with an unprecedented latitude of commercial freedom. For their part, English theorists and statesmen divided sharply over the merits of this Dutch model of “free trade.” Some of them believed that the only feasible response was to construct a state based upon legislation designed to defeat Dutch hegemony in commerce with English taxes, manufactures, and colonial markets. The most ambitious competitors in English government and commerce were willing to secure greater national profits with naval power as well. As the Duke of Albemarle put it in 1664, with reference to the appropriateness of taking New Amsterdam: “What we want is more of the trade the Dutch now have.”

Other English observers proposed not to defeat but to emulate the success of their northern neighbors, especially with respect to Hugo Grotius’ belief in the “natural and permanent” rights of nations to observe a “freedom of trade” on the expansive, uninhabited, and unconquerable open seas. Writers like Matthew Decker, William Petty, and Gerald Malynes extended this notion to the rights of individual commercial activists to “find vent” without constraint. As John Pollexfen put it, “Only freedom in trade can make trade great.” This literature promoting imitation of Dutch success was most prolific during a time when England began to emerge from a period of economic trauma and enjoy an ascent which would place its merchants in first place among European nations in the early eighteenth century, in the process, Amsterdam would be dislodged from first place in commerce and the statism which has come to be called “mercantilism” would offer benefits and opportunities to traders throughout its expanding empire.

The ambivalence of theorists and statesmen in England was evident among colonists in the western hemisphere as well. For some of them, identifying Dutch carriers was synonymous in the minds of some observers with identifying contraband cargoes and usurers; for other observers the Dutch were potentially valuable collaborators in areas of intense international rivalry. Among all rival European powers, only the Dutch tried to establish long term policies of neutrality and available credit. By the seventeenth century, British West Indies governors and merchants took note of the increasing number of statist restraints on commerce and pleaded with home officials to make exceptions enough to recognize “the necessity of free trade” with Holland and its West Indies possessions. Virginia and Maryland officials invested in tobacco exports to Amsterdam before the 1660s, much of it in vessels touching at New Amsterdam, and the deputy collector of Newport, Rhode Island regularly imported slaves from the Dutch before
and after 1664. Some English officials reported with only slight exaggeration that “all of New England” was trading with Amsterdam since the Dutch West India Company settled on the Hudson River very early in the century, and projected that this trade would continue, all diplomatic settlements between London and Amsterdam to the contrary.5

1660–1690

In the absence of reliable information about ship registrations, tonnage, and the nature and values of cargoes, it is the reports of governors and individual observers which must provide the foundations of our impressions of New York City’s early trade with the Low Countries. Following the English conquest of New Amsterdam in 1664 the “hollander interest” continued to offer an enviable commercial model among a small but powerful minority of colonists. The reasons for this are not difficult to attribute. For one thing, Albemarle’s rhetoric, which was effective in building war chests for England, was less useful in constructing New York City’s trade after the war. No English vessels flooded the fledgling colony with finished goods in 1664, although regular trade had been conducted between Amsterdam and New Netherland before 1664. Since the city’s first English governors and merchants could hardly overlook the possibilities of securing the colony’s future by reviving this trade and involving the conquered Dutch in New York City’s commercial life, they actively cast about for the right means to bring Dutch trade into the port. Given these material necessities, the language and general strategies of free trade proved to be alluring ideological props for their policies. Free trade notions were one way to explain the evasion of English regulations which did not suit New Yorkers at one time or another or to justify the pursuit of economic opportunities outside of the empire over the eighteenth century.

New York’s direct trade with Amsterdam continued legally for a brief period in 1664, until Governor Nicolls
(1664–1668) received orders from London to freeze the remaining assets of the Dutch West India Company and to assimilate Dutch traders into the newly forming body of mercantile regulations. However, Nicolls quickly grew more sensitive to the economic and social importance of a continued Dutch presence in New York and granted exceptions to the Acts of Trade and Navigation for ships headed to Amsterdam.

One of the more active participants in this Dutch trade was Cornelius Steenwyck, a former member of the Dutch West India Company and a future customs official under the English. Dutch ex-Director General, Petrus Stuyvesant, supported making these exceptions, pointing out to crown officials at London that unless the Duke of York’s colony traded with Amsterdam, French interlopers would redirect New York’s fur trade through Canada and Spain would capture the budding West Indies connections of the northern colonies. Besides, he insisted, Dutch residents of the colony had rights to a “free trade” with their mother country which antedated the conquest; private well-being, that is, superseded the changing political rights of different states over their inhabitants. In late 1664 Stuyvesant asked for permission to send four to six ships a year to the Low Countries until London could absorb the supplies of peltry and tobacco which New Yorkers exported. From late 1667 to late 1668 three ships per year were allowed clearance for Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and reports indicated that the quota was filled. In addition to Steenwyck, merchants like Oloff van Cortlandt, Jacques Cousseau, Nicholas de Meyer, Margareta Philipse, and others engaged in this commerce, even beyond its formal legal dates.

Governor Lovelace (1668–1673) was also lenient about the Dutch trade, but not out of disinterested concern for the future of the colony. He and his brother, Thomas, owned shares in the Hopewell (with Steenwyck), the Good Fame, and the Duke of York, and traded through Dutch agents Eagidius Luyck, Francis Hooghlandt, Nicholas Gouvemeur, and Isaac Bedloo, all of whom resided in New York. The first year of his administration Lovelace not only lowered import duties from 10% to 7% to accommodate the city’s merchants, but also appointed Cornelius van Ruyven as the customs collector. Van Ruyven often proved his loyalty to fellow Dutch countrymen by overlooking the port regulations which affected arriving vessels. Later in 1668 English officials gave Lovelace permission to license three ships per year from New York; in 1669 this was reduced to one per year. Nevertheless, there were some British merchants who felt that even these few ships were an unwarranted flirtation with their primary competitor nation. They noted Lovelace’s “shortsightedness” about mercantile precepts and his closeness to “Dutch petty traders” and “Dutch usurers” in the colony; merchants like Steenwyck, Cornelius van Ruyven, and Thomas Delaval bore the more straightforward epithet “hogs,” long a term of abuse in England for the Dutch.

The last of the Anglo-Dutch wars put a temporary stop to Lovelace’s involvement in foreign trade, when Dutch privateers took the Good Fame at either Texel or Sandy Hook in 1673. That same year Steenwyck lost his ship James; Thomas Delaval lost the Margaret, and Frederick Philipse lost the Frederick. But these and other losses, including the surrender of the city to the Dutch for one year, only underscored how vital the Dutch trade could be for supplying the city. Indeed, many of the city’s Dutch paused long enough with English residents to consider which mother country was, as Capt. John Manning put it, the greater “enemy in our Bowells.”

Upon resurrender of the city to the English in 1674, many Dutch and English merchants assumed the trade to Holland would reopen, and so they revived the demand for open trade to Amsterdam once again. However, the new governor, Edmund Andros, at first refused to sanction the principle of free or open trade, and in 1675 he demanded oaths of loyalty to the crown from all city residents. Eight Dutch residents, seven of them merchants, refused to take the oaths. When pressured by English officials to choose either constitutional loyalty or individual economic privilege, most chose the latter, even to the point of leaving the colony. Members of the Governor’s Council and merchants around New York’s environs interpreted the rejection of oaths as a testament of the commitment they shared to retain contacts with Amsterdam, and in the following months the Council—in which most members were concerned in the Amsterdam trade—promoted resolutions to support the commerce. By 1675, Andros himself realized the political expedience of accommodating the Dutch traders and expressed a more enlightened stance.

These minor victories for the “holland party” of traders in New York were far from secure, however. By the 1670s numbers of English merchants began migrating into the colony, some of them with clearly expressed mercantile pretentions to enforce the Acts of Trade and Navigation and curtail the favors extended to Amster-
dam traders whom they regarded as little more than “foreigners” who could never have the best interests of the empire at heart. Even worse, they noted, was the support given by “true Englishmen,” reputable commercial and political leaders, to such activities which could undermine the solidity of British domination. In 1680/81 these new arrivals joined in an attack upon Governor Andros and the “Dutch tribe” by initiating an agreement among merchants to stop paying port duties, a sure method of withdrawing support for the government and drawing attention to their displeasure. Like the more well-known non-importation movements in the 1760s to 1770s, these English merchants benefited from the stoppage of commercial taxation. However, theirs was no simple mobilization of economic self interest and ethnic hostility, for this opposition would fasten its future upon the credit of London firms and become prominent.

Robert R. Livingston was only one of the most successful Amsterdam traders; Livingston shipped goods from New York City with Stephanus van Cortlandt from 1678 to 1681, and then on his own account. Many early New York fortunes started with direct loans of Dutch capital or by accepting commission business in New York City for Dutch firms. Adolphe Philipse began with both loans and commission business in the fur, lumber, and slave trades; by 1700 he branched into West Indies logwood, Virginia tobacco, southern cotton, and Southern European wines which were sent to Dutch and English buyers. During the 1690s at least twelve New York merchants made regular shipments of peltry and tobacco to Amsterdam and ordered return cargoes of cloth, weaponry, and gunpowder. Others continued to carry southern tobacco to Rotterdam and Amsterdam as Dutch merchants had before the conquest; this trade might originate in the Low Countries and touch at New York City before going south or originate in New York City and carry commodities directly from the southern colonies to Amsterdam—with or without a stop at a British port to pay duties, depending on the disposition toward legality or smuggling.

1690–1713

If the “anglicization” of New York City trade initiated a long-term challenge which forced significant alterations in the Amsterdam trade, King William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars dramatized and escalated those changes between 1690 and 1713. Indeed, imperial rivalry during these years changed the character of the direct trade to Amsterdam permanently. In earlier years merchants preferred to export peltry to Amsterdam where prices were fairly stable, rather than to London where beaver hats became less fashionable by the end of the century and prices fell with the demand for fur imports. But during King William’s War Amsterdam prices also fell—sometimes below London prices—and peltry exporters began to complain bitterly of French privateers in the Northern seas while colonial middlemen lost whole shipments to plunderers in the countryside north and west of Albany.

In addition, the 1690s also signalled an end to reliable government support for the legal Dutch trade. Although Governor Fletcher, who arrived in 1692, did almost nothing to stop wartime clandestine voyages, especially those to Amsterdam and Rotterdam from which he was reputed to have made a personal fortune, he pursued a public policy of bolstering import duties and renewing mercantile commitment to prohibitions on foreign trade. Appointed customs official William Dyer also tried to follow Fletcher’s lead by setting new, and higher, duties...
This combination of wartime pressures and a governor who was overly ambitious forced all but the most successful merchants to abandon Amsterdam trade and prompted their more advantaged peers to concentrate fortunes in fewer hands. Before 1690, the number of New York merchants with shares in vessels to Amsterdam was usually about thirty, and forty was not unheard of. Between 1690 and 1713 the numbers who owned shares of ventures in Dutch trade began to narrow and the number of vessels engaged diminished; out of the fifty or so New York City and Albany merchants who engaged in the Amsterdam trade—as wholesalers or smaller investors—between 1666 and 1690, only a about twenty survived and prospered into the later war years.

As hard times forced some New Yorkers to leave the Dutch trade, those who were resilient made commercial adaptations which affected the future of this trade significantly. One alternative open to merchants who confronted unpredictable shifts of economic conditions was to avoid initiating commercial transactions from New York, and instead to let Dutch agents and Amsterdam merchants place orders and arrange for all the necessary fees, transportation, storage, and the like. Although some of the traders at Albany retained shares in voyages to Amsterdam before and after the 1690s, they shipped less frequently than the pre-war years, and by the end of Queen Anne’s War almost none of them imported regularly on their own accounts. Instead, they factored for Dutch merchants resident in Amsterdam or London for a $2\%$ to $5\%$ commission.

Other New York merchants were unable or unwilling to adapt their business in these ways, and chose to cope with the increasingly unfavorable climate for Dutch trade in more challenging ways. About ten to fifteen of New York City’s roughly 125 merchants ignored Fletcher’s taxes and rhetorical pleas for obedience to mercantilism; like Fletcher, they simply participated in smuggling Dutch cargoes through New Haven in the 1690s. At least three city merchants subscribed to joint ventures with Dutch merchants in the East Indies. A few, envious of the “free ports” of New Jersey and Rhode Island, physically relocated to those places, or routed their trade past the more liberal customs officials there. Still others relocated to England or Holland to serve as factors for New York merchants, and especially to ferry the legal and illicit trade. Levinus van Schaick, one of these returnees, factored for the Livingstons, Schuylers, Ten Broecks, Wandelaers, and Rosebooms until at least 1710. Having lived in both New York and Amsterdam, Van Schaick availed himself of beneficial connections in New York, London, and Amsterdam.

All of these activities continued in the next decade. Bellomont’s success in suppressing New York City’s extensive involvement with piracy in the first decade of the eighteenth century has been explained well. However historians have neglected Bellomont’s hopes to force the city’s trade with Amsterdam into legitimate channels, a hope which proved chimerical. Unscrupulous traders continued to smuggle goods directly to Amsterdam. These, said Bellomont in 1700, were among the most “Dutchified” of New York traders. By 1701 a coterie of New York and Albany merchants—Robert R. Livingston among them—jointly ventured illegal cargoes to Daniel Crommelin of Amsterdam. By 1708 Colonel Robert Quary reported to the Board of Trade that there was a persistent illicit trade in Dutch goods which went mainly through Newport. Rutger Bleecker engaged in at least one smuggling voyage to Amsterdam per year from 1707 through 1710, and an anonymous merchant cleared for Amsterdam in 1710. Thus, although fewer merchants of Dutch origins traded to Amsterdam because English merchants and principles had “invaded” New York City, even warfare did not obliterate the New York-Amsterdam trade. There were two to four registered voyages per year to Amsterdam from New York City from 1706 to 1716, and an uncertain number of illicit ones, which is generally the level at which New Yorkers traded to Amsterdam before 1689. During these years of warfare the Dutch trade’s proportion of all New York commerce also remained relatively stable.

Moreover, within the shrinking core of Dutch traders were included many of the names with which we associate eighteenth-century prosperity in New York City: Robert R. Livingston, Stephen de Lancey, Frederick and Adolphe Philipse, Nicholas Bayard, Garret Bancker, Stephen van Cortlandt, Valentine Cruger, Abraham de Peyster, Hendrick van Bael, Livinius van Schaick. In 1692 William Blathwayte listed the nine wealthiest and most respected merchants in New York City: seven were of Dutch origins; six traded higher values of goods to Amsterdam than to London before King Williams War.
1713–1740

New York merchants had two clusters of incentives to continue the "hollander trade" with Amsterdam in the years between 1713 and 1740. The first of these involved the comparatively greater benefits of Dutch, as opposed to British, trade with the colony. Amsterdam firms charged consistently lower wholesale prices for manufactures such as strouts, guns, gunpowder, and tea. Since the 1670s English fears that the Dutch were underselling them in New York were a constant refrain in private correspondence and many New York merchants actually cited two prices for the same commodity in their correspondence. Many Dutch merchants also offered longer credit than was typical among English merchants, often a full year without interest. Amsterdam warehousing and bulk cargoes techniques of storage and sales allowed Dutch merchants to purchase ahead of demand when supplies were available; their ability to market broadly and extensively also meant they could take commodities of inferior quality along with the better ones, a policy English merchants rarely dared to try.

Furthermore, while the parameters of English trade were defined largely by the extent of the empire (and, ironically, by additional Dutch demands for British tobacco and sugar), the Dutch serviced a vast system of markets outside of the production and consumption capacities of Holland alone. For example, much of the logwood, dycwoods, tobacco, fish, and slaves which made their way to Amsterdam was re-exported in time. Dutch freighting and insurance rates were also significantly lower until at least the Seven Years War, and merchants commonly noted in the period that Amsterdam’s stock of specie was larger, its ships better and more numerous, labor cheaper and more skilled, services and quality of goods better, and warehouses fuller, than England’s. Despite New York City's attempts to deny licenses to Dutch agents to insure city shippers and to serve as vendue masters, there were Dutch representatives in New York City during much of the eighteenth century. Daniel Crommelin, Adrian Hope, and John de Neufville, kept factors in the city to help discount bills of exchange and make money transfers.

This paper began with the observation that British recognition of Dutch commercial superiority was fraught with ambivalence: they mixed admiration with fear, emulation with jealousy. Since the 1690s British politics was also affected by this discussion. Tories and other "commonwealth" oppositionists often identified their goals with the “hollander interest” or free, unrestricted trade. However, there was one significant difference between these constituencies in England and the arguments of their colonial counterparts in New York. As England’s commercial security grew over the eighteenth century, the country’s merchants solidified their rise with legislation which not only did not emulate the Dutch, but quite deliberately discriminated against them. Whigs, conservative and protectionist in economic policies, aggressively turned away from free trade notions. But in New York, some colonists were persistently drawn to the Dutch as a model of economic conduct and as a source of real economic advantages, especially when New Yorkers’ interests collided with those of their mother country.

The uses to which free trade notions and Dutch alliances could be put by New Yorkers was also clearer after Queen Anne’s War, and so although the numbers of merchants engaged in the Dutch traffic shrank, self-consciousness about a felt need for its continuation grew. For example, as war conditions dissipated after 1713, the fur trade entered a period of decline. Because furs were New York’s primary economic staple (wheat would replace furs shortly, however) it incensed them that the item was enumerated—that is, added to the list of commodities which were regulated from England—in 1722 and that most of the trade was thereby diverted to London. Some of them simply continued to trade with Amsterdam. And although furs comprised 40% of New Yorkers’ goods to Holland before 1720, and only about 20-25% after 1722, their decline was even more rapid with respect to London buyers after the latter date (due to less English demand and falling prices as well as higher imperial taxes). That is, although the trade as a whole declined, Amsterdam remained a preferred market of New Yorkers. Moreover, by the 1730s English factors resident in New York exported far fewer of the colony’s pelts than did the Albany and New York City merchants with prior English and Low Countries connections. Englishman John Lewis, for example, shipped 400–500 furs per year from 1720–1729, a figure corresponding to Charles Lodwick’s, James Graham’s, and Edward Griffith’s shipments. All of them were relatively recent arrivals to New York. But Cornelius Cuyler, an established exporter of Dutch descent, averaged 5,500 furs per year in the period 1730–1734, which must have been a large proportion of the entire trade by that date. The De Lancey, Wendell, and Ten Eyck families, as well as original traders with the Dutch, also shipped fairly large numbers of furs to Amsterdam, and occasionally to England, in the 1730s.
As the fur trade declined, New Yorkers shipped other commodities to Amsterdam for which demand was more stable, among them potash, flaxseed, and copper ore. In 1714, Governor Hunter feared that copper from "Mr. Schuyler's mines" in New Jersey would be "carried into the channel of our Trade to Holland." Customs searcher Francis Harrison reported in 1721 that indeed this was happening. Other observers commented that New York's long-standing wine trade with the Southern European islands of Madera and Canary also took on new characteristics. After 1715 merchants not only included this luxury item in their return cargoes to New York City, but also shipped directly from southern Europe to Amsterdam to pay for cargoes of dry goods. In all of these cases merchants remarked that their choice of Amsterdam over London markets was due to favorable Dutch prices, freightage, insurance rates, and quality.

The second cluster of incentives to trade with the Low Countries involved New Yorkers' creative entry into the Dutch Caribbean trade. Younger, newer, or interloping merchants in particular, but some of the older families as well, developed ties with the Dutch merchants at St. Eustatius, Surinam, Curaçao, and Guinea, where new—albeit indirect—routes to Amsterdam were established and where new commodities could be secured. Like all Caribbean traffic, the growth of Dutch West Indies markets reflected new opportunities that arose out of the dislocations of war, rising demand in Europe for stimulants like sugar and coffee, and the greater prosperity of the West Indies itself. These factors drew many merchants to Caribbean trade as the supplies of furs diminished in the northern colonies.

Thus, merchants like Cornelius and Philip Cuyler clung to what peltry trade they could, but found their trade with the West Indies increased, as they said, "of necessity" because of "those unnatural acts" of Parliament. Fur traders Philip Livingston, Philip van Cortlandt, Abraham de Peyster, Cornelius Ten Broeck, Johannes de Peyster, Hans Hansen, Rutger Bleeker, Evert Wendell, Ryer Gerritse, and others also turned increasingly to trade with the West Indies after 1715. Most of their voyages were shuttles between New York City and the islands; for transatlantic voyages, New Yorkers usually deferred to Amsterdam carriers who centered the goods in their home ports or marketed the West Indian returns throughout Europe. For example, "Robert and Peter Livingston and Company" ferried between the West Indies and New York during the 1720s and 1730s, while the Dutch factors who were resident in New York City into the 1740s chartered cargoes to Amsterdam from the West Indies and occasionally even supplied New York's outgoing vessels for a triangular route. Because New York merchants and factors availed themselves of these West Indies opportunities, the Dutch trade continued to occupy a place of importance in merchants' ledgers.

In the cases of both the fur trade and new West Indies markets, earlier precedents for smuggling became models of acceptable behavior. As the tobacco, sugar, molasses, and slave trades matured, Dutch West Indies possessions attracted vessels from New York City. Captains subsequently returned to the northern port with foreign West Indies goods, or purchased shares in the ships and cargoes of tobacco, sugar, or dyewoods sent to Amsterdam directly.

Since about 1700 a few New Yorkers had woven an active network of trade involving Dutch goods and correspondents in the West Indies and Amsterdam which bypassed mandatory channels of inspection and taxation under the British mercantile system. Narrative evidence—scanty and circumspect because of the illegality involved—indicates that New York's Amsterdam-bound vessels (whether Dutch or New York owned) often simply eliminated British ports of call where costly duties should have been paid for enumerated items. From 1713 to about 1720, Evert Wendell exported furs to his correspondent William van Nuy in Amsterdam, and imported dry goods and tea at Newport or through family members at Boston. After 1720 Wendell shipped his commodities through Stephen de Lancey in New York City, who in turn sent the goods first to Boston, or directly to Amsterdam. Others in Albany also traded directly to Amsterdam and avoided duties: in the 1720s Hendrick Ten Eyck, Robert Sanders, David van der Heyden, Jelles Fonda, and Jacob Glen; and in the 1730s–40s, Henrick Ten Eyck and Cornelius Cuyler. Most of these traders at least occasionally engaged in smuggling through Canada as well.

Long after furs were enumerated in 1722, New York City merchants Isaac Low, William Glencross, Olaf van Sweeten, John Barbarie, Benjamin Faneuil, Rip van Dam, Henry Cuyler, and John Cruger shipped peltry to Amsterdam for Albany merchants, while city merchants like Frederick Philips, Stephan de Lancey, Philip Livingston, Robert R. Livingston, Jr., Henry Cuyler, Rip van Dam, and Hyman Levy traded directly between New York and Amsterdam on their own accounts. This latter
group also sold peltry in London and forwarded the net proceeds to Dutch firms through Samuel Storke of London. Merchants at Amsterdam then made up cargoes for the New Yorkers, which touched at Dover or the Orkneys, where customs officials were notoriously corruptible, before crossing the Atlantic.53 The Bleekers of New York City borrowed capital from Charles Lodwick of London and transmitted it to the Bleekers of Amsterdam, who in turn supplied the colony with orders for dry goods.54

1740 to 1764

By the 1740s the resilience of New York–Amsterdam trading patterns became a primary concern of British mercantilists, for it seemed that the more imperial legislation circumscribed colonial trade, the more conviction certain New Yorkers developed about the appropriateness—some said the necessity—of the Dutch West Indies and smuggling trades. Their most common argument was that without the foreign trade, necessary specie and bills of exchange (the Dutch West Indies supplied the greatest quantities of both) would never pass into their hands in large enough quantities to balance their payments with the mother country for imported manufactures. Moreover, the benefits of legal trade with neutral Dutch possessions during peace time was significant, illicit trade during wars was even more profitable. Using established routes and correspondents, merchants simply gained more as risks rose. Thus, although New York City entrances from, and clearances to, Amsterdam declined after 1740 there is no necessary reason to believe that the trade itself declined. From 1724 to 1731 two to six ships cleared and zero to three ships entered New York from Amsterdam per year. From 1740 to 1764 only one to three vessels cleared and zero to two entered New York City legally. Yet travel accounts and private letters indicate a rise in the illegal trade with Amsterdam, especially that which went via West Indies possessions, the Orkney Islands of Scotland, or in Southern Europe where safe conduct passes were easily procurred. Also, retailers announced “holland goods” for sale in New York with greater frequency over these decades.55

The most perdurable route was that which took in the West Indies on the outgoing voyage and passed through New England on the return from Amsterdam. For the West Indies connections, city exporters shipped lumber, grain, bread, and small horses to Curacao and Surinam. However, the value of imports from those places was often much lower than for exports, indicating that New Yorkers either returned with specie and bills of exchange or forwarded part of the net proceeds on to Amsterdam to pay for previous and future cargoes of cloth, paper, and gunpowder. Or, as Archibald Kennedy noted in 1739, much of New York’s produce went to any of the British or foreign West Indies islands, and returns were in Dutch gunpowder that was smuggled through St. Eustatius from Amsterdam instead of directly from Amsterdam.56 David “Ready Money” Provost, of solid Dutch descent, returned from many voyages to St. Eustatius at mid-century with rum and gunpowder as well as foreign silver and bills of exchange; he usually transferred these into a larger vessel at New York and sent them on to Amsterdam.57

In the 1740s fur traders in the Wendell and Livingston families supplemented return cargoes of sugar and molasses from the West Indies with rice from the Carolinas and logwood from Honduras, or consigned their captains to carry the goods directly to Amsterdam.58 Philip Livingston also periodically added New York and New England flaxseed and local lumber to his grain shipments to the West Indies; these were transferred into Dutch ships at St. Eustatius and routed to Amsterdam.59 Some merchants—Philip Livingston, Robert and Barent Sanders, Hendrick Ten Eyck, and John Cuyler—arranged cargoes into two separate voyages: one to the West Indies, which was sold, the proceeds being used to load a second (larger or different) vessel which then set out for Amsterdam from a West Indies port without stopping to pay British customs.60

Though Robert Sanders was originally involved in the fur trade, he shipped French West Indies sugar from St. Eustatius to New York for Robert and Richard Ray in the 1730s-1740s, and then on to the Van der Grifts of Amsterdam on occasion.61 Alternatively, Sanders and the Rays sold their peltry in London and instructed Samuel Storke to forward the net proceeds to Dutch firms, which were in turn asked to make up cargoes which touched at Dover or the Orkneys before crossing the Atlantic for New York City. Merchants such as Robert Sanders, John Cruger, Cornelius Cuyler, William Johnson, and Johannes Bleecker exported fewer furs but more ginseng and potash to Amsterdam from the 1730s to 1740s, sometimes using the firm of Storke and Champion as an intermediary with Dutch firms.62

By the mid-1740s these jointly ventured connections proved to be a popular means of underwriting risks. The Cuylers joined their capital with Edmund and Josiah
Quincy of Boston to smuggle mixed cargoes to the Hopes of Amsterdam. Christopher Bancker carried on a similar business during the Seven Years War with Daniel Crommelin of Amsterdam. A few merchants of Dutch business during the Seven Years War with Daniel of Amsterdam. Christopher Bancker carried on a similar trade with stops at Madeira or London on occasion. From 1748 to 1750, during a period of economic prosperity which followed King George's War, Gerard G. Beekman expanded his correspondence with Amsterdam merchants; he also insured New York vessels bound for Amsterdam in 1756–7 and 1761, and owned shares in the Sarah and Ann and Little Gerry in 1754 to 1760. His and other vessels which were partially filled with flaxseed rounded St. Eustatius, picking up cocoa and sugar before crossing to Amsterdam. Gerard O. Beekman and Nicholas Gouverneur of New York City corresponded with Nicholas and Isaac Gouverneur of Curacao and St. Eustatius, and Daniel Crommelin and John Hodshon of Amsterdam. John van Cortlandt imported West Indies sugar which he refined in New York City, almost one half of which was then reexported to South Carolina, England, or Amsterdam. Waddell Cunningham speculated in the purchase of prize goods which he sent in bulk quantities to Amsterdam in 1756.

Through the Seven Years War voyages from the Carolinas and West Indies to Amsterdam often were funded—wholly or in part—with London credit. Then, the return voyage to New York from Amsterdam was secured by the London firms transferring capital to Amsterdam for New Yorkers. Londoners like William Snell, Richard Champion, Joseph Mico, and Samuel Storke transferred funds or underwrote insurance for Amsterdam voyages, and Waddell Cunningham converted bills of exchange on London for Dutch currency and credit through Snell in 1756. Some New Yorkers transported goods to London, where they disposed of the first cargo and acquired a second one for the jaunt from London to Amsterdam. In Amsterdam the captain often sold not only the freight but the vessel as well, placing the return cargoes of less bulk and higher value in the holds of vessels jointly ventured by many merchants. The return voyages from Amsterdam involved primarily, though not exclusively, five Dutch firms: Thomas and Adrian Hope (future participants in funding first the British during the Seven Years War, and then American patriots during the Revolution); John Hodshon (whose ties to London banking and government loans were well known by the 1740s); Daniel Crommelin (a refugee Huguenot who emigrated to New York in the 1720s, then to Amsterdam by about 1733, where he remained until his death in 1768); William van der Griff; and William van Nuys. New Yorkers continued to bring back from these firms the usual dry goods, tea, gunpowder, and odd luxury items in special personal orders. That New Yorkers continued to smuggle through these firms, to and from Amsterdam during the Seven Years War even when privateering absorbed much of New York's commercial investment capital and when the high seas were rife with enemy privateers illustrates how important the traffic was to the few merchants it would sustain. Governor Hardy said in 1757 that it was common for ships "to come from Holland, stop at Sandy Hook, and smuggle their Cargoes to New York and carry their Vessels up [the Hudson] empty." From the 1730s to the 1750s the ship Mary and Margaret—owned by about sixteen New Yorkers—brought gunpowder from Holland to New York. Along with John Sherburne of Portsmouth and John Reynell of Philadelphia, a coterie of New York merchants chartered four vessels in 1760 to smuggle French sugar through St. Eustatius and to Amsterdam. Gerard G. Beekman smuggled sugar to Amsterdam that year in a sole venture, and Philip Cuyler continued his correspondence with John Hodshon. In all cases they smuggled back tea, "Dutch duck and checks," and silks. Late that same year the Venus departed from Amsterdam and sailed boldly directly into Sandy Hook without paying duties.

Even after the Revenue Act of 1764—the imperial legislation which intended to tax more steeply and enforce commercial legality more strenuously—New York vessels went to Amsterdam without required clearance papers, duties, or the obligatory stop at British ports. That year there were twelve New York clearances for Newfoundland, five or six of which vessels made their way to Amsterdam and Rotterdam by the end of the year; whether two or three of these went on to pay duties or smuggle through British ports, or the vessels were sold is unclear for there is no further record of them; but three of the Newfoundland-to-Amsterdam vessels were filled with linen, sailcloth, gunpowder, tea and bricks, which
were despatched back from Amsterdam to New York City through Rhode Island cities. That same year, 1764, forty-one more vessels cleared for the West Indies than entered from that area; after allowing that the great majority of these vessels smuggled molasses and sugar through New England and Long Island, and that a few rerouted legally through southern Europe and New England, there were at least three and perhaps six among the forty-one vessels which crossed the Atlantic directly for Holland.

Most return voyages were more direct, but probably often less legal than the outward voyages. New York captains came, for example, through a New England port, especially after “watchdogs” from the British navy planted themselves outside Sandy Hook in 1756. Merchants Luke van Ranst, Rem Rapalje, Jacobus van Zant, John van Cortlandt, Isaac Roosevelt, Leonard Lispenard, Peter Keteltas, David van Horn, and Henry Bogert traded through James Rhodes, William Molineaux, Solomon Davis, Henry Lloyd, William Cooper, and John Erving of Boston, all of whom were known smugglers and Dutch importers. But other routes developed by the 1740s as well, as when a vessel from Amsterdam bound for New York City registered and paid duties on part of the load often listing New York City as a port of call, with the final destination being in the Caribbean, and then proceeding to dump all of the commodities at New York City. For example, Lt. Governor De Lancey reported in 1758 that merchants of New York and Boston ordered goods from Holland which they landed at Rhode Island, though the laded port of destination was St. Johns (Antigua). John Hodgshon was their Amsterdam connection. Alternatively, Amsterdam goods were laded for New York City and made the obligatory stop at a British port to pay duties; but instead of unloading and reloading the whole cargo, or “breaking load” as the law required, the Orkney Islands collectors might illegally clear vessels “by the lump” at very low duties. The notorious tea trade often operated in this fashion.

The Legacy

Contemporary assessments of the trade with Holland almost invariably exaggerated how many merchants, how many ships, and what value of goods were involved. For example, even in 1752 Governor Clinton clung to the perception that the traffic to the Low Countries would undermine England’s ascendancy insisted that “Holland ... receives more benefit from the Trade of the Northern Colonies, than Great Britain does.” Others referred to all commerce which disrupted the status quo with the generic epithet “hollander trade” or “dutchified interests.” Most threatening to colonial authorities, however, was not the extent of New York’s trade with Amsterdam, for it was never a large trade, but its persistence and adaptability; there is no evidence that more tea, for example, made its way into New York after 1760, but it was popularly known that Dutch tea was available in large quantities at a low cost.

Whether its availability created demand or demand motivated the continued liaisons with Holland does not determine a more important generalization: that English awareness of the trade’s tenacity, its overlap with the markets and dry goods trade, and the economic advantages of Dutch connections, drove late colonial governors to distraction and remained an important issue during New York’s imperial crisis at the end of the century. It was in the context of much merchant apprehension that the Dutch trade would be cut off after the war that Cadwallader Colden wrote in 1760 about a clamour in New York for “Dutch free trade.” Even at the end of the colonial period some English observers and loyal mercantilists in the colonies believed that Americans had developed habits of luxury consumption and political insubordination because of the opportunities provided by “hollander interests.” Indeed, some found that the “Rage and Fury” against imperial rule was nosiest among the “Dutchified Patriots.”

Nevertheless, no matter how out of proportion the English fears of, or American hopes for the trade, what remains important are the Dutch images, meanings, and concrete reactions attached to it long after the ships of Dutch and British economic development had crossed paths, the former a once great trading power now on the decline and the latter indebted for its ascent in part of America to Dutch influences. Indeed, it is possible that the language and habits of a “hollander trade”—often interchangeably referred to as “free trade”—helped American revolutionists discover how their interests often could be bound more closely with the fate of a traditional enemy than with the goals of their own empire.
Notes


The commercial rivalries and ambivalent sentiments between the Low Countries and England are but one part of the larger context of transatlantic relationships in the early modern period which I explore in my dissertation, “Fair Trade, Free Trade: Economic Ideas and Opportunities in Eighteenth-Century New York City Commerce” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1985); see chaps. 1–2 on the ideological structure of empire.

3 For West Indies statements in favor of free trade as they thought the Dutch practiced it, see, eg., Answer of Charles Whe[j]er, Governor of the Leeward Islands, to the inquiries of the Council for Foreign Plantations, Dec. 9, 1671, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, American and West Indies, 1661–1738, ed. Noel W. Sainsbury. J.W. Fortescue, and Cecil Headlam, 42 vols. (London: Public Record Office, 1860–1953), 1669–1674, 290; (hereafter cited as Cal. State Papers); Petition of the inhabitants of Antigua to Governor Lord Willoughby, ibid., 1661–1668, 234, where they ask “for a grant of free trade”; Petition of the President, Council, and Assembly of Barbadoes, ibid., 1661–1668, 29–30; Petition of the President and Council of Barbadoes to the King, July 10, ibid., 1661, 46; Lord Willoughby to the King, Jan. 11, 1663, ibid., 1661–1668, 162; Lord Willoughby to the King, Nov. 4, 1663, ibid., 1661–1668, 167–68; Propositions of Mr. Kendall, November 1664, ibid., 1661–1668, 253; Order of the King and Council, November 24, 1675, Cal. State Papers, 1574–1674, ed. Noel Sainsbury (London: 1893), 303–4; An Account of His Majesty’s Island of Barbadoes and the Government thereof, 1676, ibid., 1574–1674, 348–49.

See also how Governor Windsor of Jamaica urged planters to seek “free commerce with the plantations... of Spain and Holland” despite international rivalries, and try “to admit them to a free trade”; Additional Instructions to Thomas Lord Windsor, Governor of Jamaica, April 8, 1662, Cal. State Papers, 1661–1668, 85. In words reminiscent of Hugo Grotius’s plea for free ships and free seas, Lord Willoughby, the governor of Barbados, claimed in 1666 that “Free Trade is the life of all Colonies” and to regulate it as the Navigation Acts did was to invite disaster; quoted by H. E. Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Politics, 5th ed., (London: Methuen, 1918), 76.

Following the second Anglo–Dutch war many English writers promoted a “Free Trade” with the Dutch of Curacao; see, for example, Lewes Roberts, The Merchant’s Mappe of Commerce, (London, 1638), 120. Throughout the eighteenth century some writers emphasized the desirability of freer trade in the Caribbean with reference to Dutch successes there; see, eg., writings of Jonathan Swift, Daniel Defoe, Josiah Tucker, and
Adam Smith. Of course, the original free trade strain in the Caribbean becomes a clamor for regulation by about 1713, and mercantilism is dominant from that time forward. See Klaus Knoor, *British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850,* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1944); and Eric Williams, *Columbus to Castro,* (New York: Vintage, 1986), 529.


7The grant of three ships per year in 1667 and Stuyvesant's reasons are at *Documents Relative, III: 113-15, 163-64, 164-65, 165-66, 175-78,* and Minutes of the Committee of Plantations, Oct. 17, 1667, *Cal. State Papers, 1661-1668,* 511. See also, *Documents Relative, III: 178-82.* There is no statistical evidence about the cargoes of these vessels.


11*Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution,* ed., James Lyon, 5 vols. (Albany: J.B. Lyon, 1894), 1: 24-25, 111-23, 125-28, 137-41. These citations also indicate some of the vessels trading between New York City and Amsterdam, some during the third Anglo-Dutch war.

12Sir John Werden to Gov. Andros, Sep. 15, 1675. *Documents Relative, III: 233.* The eight who refused the oath were: Cornelius Steenwyck, Johannes van Brugh, Johannes de Peyster, Nicholas Bayard, Eaqidius Luyck, William Beekman, Jacob Kip, Antonio de Mill. See also, *Documents Relative, II: 738-44.* In 1676 New York City also began its formal moves to destroy aspects of Albany's economic predominance by creating a city customs tax monopoly and granting Albany a monopoly of the fur trade; *Androws, Colonial Period, IV: 105-6.*


For Andros’ reputation, see, Anthony Brockholls to Andros, 17 Sep. 1681, Documents Relative, iii: 211–12, 233, 281; Ritchie, The Duke’s Province, 115–20. Of the seven wealthiest merchants in 1676 only Leisler was not “assimilated” and rejected Andros’ leadership; see roles of Gabriele Minvielle, Johannes de Peyster, James Laurence, and Nicholas Bayard in particular. Some of the “free traders” who refused to pay taxes in 1680–1681 included M. Nicholls, John Laurence, Henry Beckman, Schermerhorn, Philipse, Van Cortlandt; see Colonial Laws, i: 111–16. In 1688, Raynard, Van Cortlandt, and Philipse were on the opposite side and scorned tax revolters like Cornelius Cuyler and Gerard Beekman and Jacob Leisler; see Jerome Reich, Leisler’s Rebellion: A Study of Democracy in New York, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 69–73. The major opposition to Andros’ alleged support for “free trade” came from small farmers who did not benefit from legislation favoring New York City exporters, and newly arrived English merchants who preferred special regulations which would aid their entry into trade in New York City as against “monopolies” of “Dutch” traders in either Albany or New York City, and who were against taxes in all events; see Netts, “Economic Relations,” 185–215. For duties from 1674 to 1678, which were 2–3% on imports and 1 sh. 3 d. on heavier exports, see Colonial Laws, i: 116–21.  

For a 10% ad valorem tax passed in Dongan’s administration, see Colonial Laws, i:170–71. For Dongan’s belief that his policies were a success by 1685, see Answers of Governor Andros to enquiries about New York, April 16, 1678, Documents Relative, iii: 260–62; Minutes of the Common Council, i: 18; Ritchie, The Duke’s Province, 121–23. On Dongan and city merchants in general see Dongan to William Blathwayt, Sep. 11, 1686, Documents Relative, iii: 363–64; Dongan to the Board of Trade, ibid., iii: 393–99; Instructions to John Palmer, Sep. 8, 1687, ibid., iii: 475–77; Gabriele Minvielle to John Werden, 1687, ibid., iii: 361; Address of the Mayor and Common Council to the King, 1688, ibid., iii: 424–25; Duke of York to Dongan, Aug. 26, 1684, ibid., iii: 349–59; Werden to Dongan, Nov. 1, 1684, ibid., iii: 351–52. 1683 export taxes rose to 9 d. per heavier and 10% on dry goods imports; ibid., t: 165–67. In 1684 the 10% ad valorem tax was extended to all imports; ibid., i: 170–71. Leisler’s administration lowered duties to 5–6% on selected items, which were continued until 1700; An Account of Her Majesty’s Revenue in the Province of New York, 1701–1709, eds., Julius Bloch, et al., (Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, 1966), intro.; (hereafter cited as An Account of Her Majesty’s Revenue); and The Documentary History of the State of New York, ed. E.B. O’Callaghan, 4 vols. (Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1849–1851), ii: 52, 73, 238, 340, 355; Documents Relative, iii: 270–71, 737–48. Only after Leisler’s Rebellion was “free bolting” restored (against English merchants’ desires) and import taxes disallowed (which they favored).  


Documents Relative, iii:183; Lt.-Col. Edward Thornburgh to the Assembly of Barbadoes, April 1,
1673, Cal. State Papers, 1669–1674, 475; Documents Relative, iii: 352, 393.
21 Correspondence of Jeremias Van Rensselaer, 376, 388, 390–91, 408, 412–13, 466–72.
22 Answers of Governor Andros to enquiries about New York, 16 April 1678, Documents Relative, iii: 260–62; Minutes of the Common Council, i: 18
26 Governor Fletcher to William Blathwayt, Sep. 10, 1692, Documents Relative, iii: 846; Board of Trade’s Report on the Northern Colonies, Sep. 3, 1696, ibid., iv: 227–28; Fletcher to Blathwayt, Mar. 8, 1693, Cal. State Papers, 1693, #179; Report from the New York Council Minutes, Apr. 14, 1693, ibid., 1693, #274. Fletcher favored this hardening core of English merchants with land grants and allowed piracy to flourish in New York.
For the land grants, see Documents Relative, iv: 191, 1045, iii: 230; Minutes of the Common Council, i: 25–26, 29–37, 50–62; Proceedings of the General Court of Assizes, 1680–1682, New—York Historical Society Collections, xlv (New York: NYHS, 1912), 8–17, 24. The English merchants involved were: John Robinson, William Pinhome, and Edward Anthill, all soon to be prominent Dutch goods importers, and other English importers, including Samuel Wilson, John Young, Thomas Willett, Thomas Hicks, John Jackson, Richard Stillwell, John West, John Laurence, Samuel Moore, William Darvall, and John Delavall. See also note 15 above.
When Cornbury became governor, he granted a renewal of the bolting monopoly from 1702–04, but did not necessarily favor the Dutch trade; Reich, Leister’s Rebellion, 164. It is also clear from Leder’s study of military gleanings from myriad colonial sources; see Matson, “Fair Trade, Free Trade,” chap. 3–6.
27 For example, Public Records Office, E 190:644/2 (Dec. 1677, the Rebecca); 117/1 (Apr. 1683, the Blossom); 80/1, 841/3, 834/9; and An Account of Her Majesty’s Revenue, intro. The numbers of Amsterdam traders before and after 1690 are based upon my preliminary gleanings from myriad colonial sources; see Matson, “Fair Trade, Free Trade,” chap. 3–6.
28 The Livingston–Redmund Mss., Hyde Park, New York, show evidence for R. R. Livingston’s shipments in the 1690s and his dealings with Albany–area merchants; in the collection see, “Freight List of the Brigantine Robert, Dec. 3, 1694.” Also, Jonathan Pearson, transl., Early Records of the City and County of Albany and Colony of Rensselaer, Deeds, 1678–1704, (Albany: Univ. of the State of New York, 1916), 324, for a mention of “free trade” to Amsterdam in 1687 and the New York City merchants’ “monopoly” of export business. The reference could have been to New York City’s “great merchants,” Cornelius Cuyler, Stephen de Lancey, and Frederick Philipsen. For the efforts to keep duties low during the 1690s, see An Account of Her Majesty’s Revenue, intro.
31 Van Schaick Papers, Box 1, 1696, New York Public Library; Leder, Robert R. Livingston, 49, 77–95, where there is evidence that he traded directly with merchants Harwood and Blackall of London, and that Fletcher had shares in the Dutch voyaging vessels in 1692; and Wolley, A Two Years Journal, 59.
32 Bellmont to the Lords of Trade, 1700, Documents Relative, iv: 792. For evidence of importing Dutch goods in 1702–03, see Miller Papers, Abraham de Peyster Papers, and Abraham Wendell Papers, all at New-York Historical Society. As Leder points out, while Bellmont hoped to impose and enforce duties and regulations upon all city merchants in mercantile fashion, his complaints against “free trade” and “Dutchified” commerce were matched by his attacks against the assimilated Dutch and New England merchants with land grants or special commercial privileges too. Also, Bellmont’s council was neither Leislerian nor Fletcherian, but moderate. Generally, though, Leder concludes that the “Dutch” on
the Council and Assembly are contrary to Bellomont's plans, including merchants Van Sweeten, Hansen, and Van Brugh; Leder, *Robert R. Livingston*, 170–73.  

33The merchants in this illicit trade network included Robert R. Livingston, John L. Livingston, Samuel Vetch, Onzee van Sweeten, Levinus van Schaick, Micajah Perry, Margaret Schuyler, Jacobus van Cortlandt, and three lesser men named Barbarie, Pero, and Marquis. The English (and some French) participants included merchants Caleb Heathcote, Philip French, Thomas Wenham, Dirk Wessels, David Jamison, and Peter Pauconnier and one named Vesey. The vessels were Catharine, Industry, and Dove. See Leder, *Robert R. Livingston*, 174–75, 181; and *An Account of Her Majesty's Revenue*, passim.  


35Harmanus Veening [of Amsterdam] to Rutger Bleecker, May 5, 1707; June 16, 1708; Apr. 19, 1709; June 15, 1710, Bleecker–Collins–Abeel Papers, New York Public Library.  

36*Documents Relative*, IV: 792.  

37Leder, *Robert R. Livingston*, 84–85. The Dutch were Robert R. Livingston, Stephanus van Cortlandt, Nicholas Bayard, Gabrielle Minvielle, Frederick Philipse, Philip Schuyler, and Charles Lodwock; the English were Graham and Lewis Morris. Blathwayte went on to say that Englishmen J. Dudley, William Pinhorne, and Richard Townley were of rising influence, and that John Lawrence and Thomas Johnson were among other English "wretches" of no money or influence.  

38*An Account of Her Majesty's Revenue*, passim; Thomas Archdacon, *New York City, 1664–1710: Conquest and Change*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 48–50. For New York City shipping to Amsterdam, 1706–16, see C. O. 5/1051, Bb98. A similar rise in proportions of all West Indies trade, and New York City involvement in West Indies–Amsterdam trade may have been the case, although the evidence is inconclusive; ibid. from mid-1715 to mid-1718, 85 of 645 clearances, or 13% of New York's voyages were legal ones to foreign ports; C. O. 324/10, at 386–87.  

39Public Records Office, E 190/80/1, fols. 87–89; E 117/1 (April 1683, the Blossom), E 644/2 (Dec. 1677, the Rebecca). Also, E 190 841/3, 834/9. Some of these traders, including Philipse, Barbarie, and Stephen de Lancey, were also in the African pirate trade; Robert R. Livingston and Abraham de Peyster are relatively new entrants in this trade; see Ritchie, *The Duke's Province*, 194.  


42These Dutch practices also stand in contrast to English ones, where more capital is going into government loans or "vertical integration" of new manufactures, and merchants remain relatively non-specialized. See, eg., *Report of the British Board of Trade and Plantations, November 1702*, Mss., New York Public Library; Lord Combury to the Board of Trade, 1702, *Documents Relative*, IV: 1003; Edmund Randolph to the Board of Trade, C.O. 323:2, #6; Randolph to the Board of Trade, *Cal. State Papers*, 1696, 214; [?] to the Board of Trade, ibid., 1669, 487, 553; Jacob Judd, "Gleanings from a Captain's Letters," *New-York Historical Society Quarterly*, 52 (1968), 270–74; and Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam*, 21–23.  


44Bollan to the Board of Trade, Feb. 26, 1743, C. O. 5/883, Ee87; Barrow, *Trade and Empire*, 153.  


47 On West Indies smuggling via the Dutch since at least the 1580s, see D. W. Davies, A Primer of Dutch Overseas Trade, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961). On the rise of the Dutch in the Caribbean in general, see Cornelis C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680, (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1971). For British responses, see n. 3 above. For an excellent example of New York trade with the Dutch in the Caribbean and Amsterdam, an involved set of relationships even in the early years of the eighteenth century, see Philip van Cortlandt Letterbook, 1713–1722, New-York Historical Society (microfilm copy at the Univ. of Tennessee, Hoskins Library).


50 See miscellaneous entries listed in “Ships” file, New-York Historical Society; Jacob Wendell, Letterbook, New–York Historical Society; Peter and Robert Livingston, Jr., Letterbook. Museum of the City of New York; and Miscellaneous Manuscripts, New York State Library. The latter gives evidence that Livingston’s business with Samuel Storke alternated between legal and illicit voyages.


58 For example, Robert R. Livingston Papers, Reel 1, Nicholas Gouverneur Correspondence, John Cruger Letters, Correspondence of Richard and Robert Ray, Misc. Manuscripts, Francis Lewis Correspondence, 1751–1786, Abraham Keteltas Account Book, 1744–1761, all at the New-York Historical Society. For evidence of a Dutch ship which smuggled sugar through South Carolina and Jamaica in 1748, and traded with New York on some voyages, see Barrow, Trade and
Empire, 146, 151, 166.
55 Philip Livingston Letters, Museum of the City of New York.
62 Harrington, New York Merchant, 250–52; White, The
63 Beekmans, 331.
66 Joshua Gee to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Oct. 27, 1721, Cal. State Papers, 1720–1721, 470–75, esp. 474; David Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation, 4 vols., (London, 1805), iii: 164–66; Francis Lewis Correspondence, 1751–1786; Hugh Wallace, Letters; John Alsop Correspondence, 1733–1794; Charles Nicoll, Account Books; Walter and Samuel Franklin Correspondence; John Waddell Correspondence, all at the New-York Historical Society. Merchants could also voyage from New York City to the West Indies and on to Amsterdam, where cargo and vessel both were sold; Goldberg, Shipbuilding, 20–21, 100–05.
70 Governor Hardy to the Board of Trade, July 15, 1757, C.O. 5/1068, fol. 30–33; George Clinton to the Board of Trade, Oct. 4, 1752, C.O. 5/1064, fol. 144–47.
71 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 149–50.
73 Tyler, “The First Revolution”, 68.
75 C.O. 5:1225–1226. A similar imbalance in entrances
and clearances obtained in 1768, 1769, and 1770.


82 Governor George Clinton to the Board of Trade, Oct. 4, 1752, C.O. 5/1064, fol. 144–47; New York Gazette, Oct. 1, 1739; Norton, The Fur Trade, 176, 208–10. Lined up against Cosby, Montgomerie, Johnson, Clarke, and Clinton were Oliver and Stephen de Lancey, John Watts, and some Albany merchants.

83 "P," Providence Gazette, Jan. 21, 1764.


85 London Public Advertiser, Jan. 26, 1775; Address of the People of Great Britain to the Inhabitants of America, (London, 1775), 5.

86 For an example of the enduring ties to Amsterdam up to and during the American Revolution, see John Alsop Correspondence, 1733–1794, New-York Historical Society. See also Matson, “Fair Trade, Free Trade,” chap. 7 and conclusion.