Annals of New Netherland

The Dutch among the People of the Long River

Dr. Charles T. Gehring, Director
New Netherland Project

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Preface

The subject of this year’s Annals was originally presented as a talk at the second Pequot Conference in Mystic, Connecticut in 1993. The title refers to the Algonquian meaning of Connecticut as the “long river.” The Dutch named the same waterway the Versche Rivier or “fresh river.”

Although the intent of this paper was to focus on Dutch relations with the Native Americans in the Connecticut Valley, it begins with a survey of Dutch commercial expansion and exploration in the context of its 80-years’ struggle for independence from Spain. Why the Dutch were operating along the coast of Connecticut is as important a question as what they did there. Ironically, this region, which attracted Dutch commercial interests the earliest (only a few years after Hudson), has yielded the least amount of documentary evidence. However, recent years has shown a growing interest in the Dutch impact on Connecticut both through historical analysis of documentary sources as well as archæological discoveries of Dutch presence in the region. It is hoped that interest will increase to the extent that the history of the Versche Rivier will become as well documented as that of the Noort en Suyt Rivieren.

The Annals of New Netherland owes its existence to the Consulate General of the Netherlands in New York City, directed by Consul General Bob Hiensch, who developed the idea for the series and set aside funds to cover expenses.

The frontispiece is Adriaen van der Donck’s map of New Netherland, ca. 1656. Courtesy of the New York State Library; photo by Dietrich C. Gehring.

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De Witte Leeuw ("The White Lion") was a heavily-armed trading ship of 320 tons, sailing out of Amsterdam. While looking for a profitable cargo in the fishing grounds off Newfoundland, it captured two vessels in St. Mary’s Bay. One was a Spanish ship from which the Dutch crew took 107 barrels of train oil and seven guns; the other was a Portuguese ship carrying 24,000 pieces of cod. Although a complaint to the king of France forced the owners to return the naval ordnance from the two ships, the merchants back in Amsterdam must have been satisfied with the return on their investment from the sale of the cod and the train oil (Hart 1959: 13-14). Nothing about this incident should excite our interest here except that it occurred in the year 1606, three years before the arrival of Henry Hudson in the New World.

Hudson's explorations in 1609 were by no means a revelation to the Dutch. They had been sending ships to the fishing and whaling grounds from Greenland to the New England coast for decades. As subjects of the Hapsburg Empire Dutch seamen had served aboard Spanish ships around the world. When the Dutch did arrive in the New World as competitors to the French, Spanish, and English, their appearance must be considered in the context of the times. The Dutch nation was not just another imperialist power bent on overseas domination, whether for religious or economic reasons. As a nation it was the youngest in Europe. It had successfully revolted against its powerful master and was struggling for survival. Appearance of the Dutch in the New World, whether in Connecticut or the Caribbean, was a direct result of economic needs in the homeland. With the wealth of the country dependent on the success of the commercial operations of the middle class, there was one major concern: to maximize the profits of investors.

Before we examine Dutch activities in the Fresh River region of New Netherland, we should answer some basic questions: Who were the Dutch? What were they doing in the New World? And then: What did they do once they got here?

"Better Turk than Papist," or the Revolt of the Netherlands and the Rise of the Companies

The Netherlands as we know the country today was not a definable political entity in the sixteenth
century. Before the Dutch nation emerged on the European scene as a major naval power with commercial interests throughout the world, it had been but a remote corner of the Hapsburg Empire. The manner in which the Low Countries (name for the region comprising both present-day Belgium and the Netherlands) became a possession of this far-flung empire is too complex to relate here in any detail; however, in simplified form it happened as follows: In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the dukes of Burgundy had acquired the collection of seventeen provinces that comprised the Low Countries through a succession of dynastic marriages, purchases, and bequests. When Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, married Maximillian Hapsburg, the Low Countries were brought into an empire that would circle the globe.

As a part of the Hapsburg Empire the Low Countries was one of the most prosperous regions of Europe. This can be partly attributed to the industriousness of its population but mostly to its strategic location in the northwestern corner of Europe. A glance at a map of Europe shows that the Low Countries are separated from England only by a narrow channel; are midway between the Baltic and Mediterranean worlds; and are the terminus of three major river systems, the Rhine, Maas, and Scheldt—watersheds for large areas of France and Germany. Within this strategic area there developed a merchant class that would soon control most of the Baltic and Mediterranean carrying trade, and send fleets of ships around the world.

For centuries the Baltic trade or moeder negotie (the mother trade) as the Dutch called it, was the mainstay of their commercial activity. As a component of the Hapsburg Empire goods flowed into the Netherlands from all over the world. There they were warehoused, often reprocessed or refined, and shipped on to the Baltic in exchange for grain and timber—both commodities in much demand in the Netherlands itself as well as in the Mediterranean region. Portugal, for example, shipped spices into the Netherlands from the Far East and salt from the Iberian Peninsula. While England and the Baltic region were a ready market for the spices, the salt was consumed by the flourishing Dutch herring industry. However, this lucrative commercial balance was disrupted in 1568 when the Low Countries revolted against its master, the Hapsburg Empire.

The revolt was a consequence of several actions initiated by Philip II of Spain who had inherited the Low Countries upon the abdication of his father Charles V. Charles was born in Ghent and was brought up among the Flemish nobility. His affection for the Low
Countries came from the heart. His son Philip, on the other hand, was born in Spain and had no love for these cold and damp holdings on the northern edge of the empire. While the wealth of the Low Countries had been funding Hapsburg foreign entanglements for generations in return for various local rights and privileges, Philip considered them as a mere fatted cow to be exploited. Rather than negotiate for financial support he attempted to establish a central control and authority to the detriment of local privileges. As galling as this cerebral issue was to the Dutch, Philip also struck an emotional chord. As a devout Catholic he considered the reformed movement in the North as a disease to be stamped out before it spread. His solution was the establishment of the inquisition in the Low Countries to suppress the Protestant heresy. Thus Philip’s attempt to establish a central control to provide economic and human resources for his political agenda, and his inability to view his subjects in the North as nothing but hostile heretics, fueled a revolt from which would arise a new country, a new people, and a new world-trading power.4

The revolt of the Netherlands was also to become known as the Eighty Years’ War. The first phase lasted from 1568 until the beginning of the Twelve Years Truce in 1609. During this time tens of thousands of Protestant refugees fled north to the newly proclaimed United Provinces of the Netherlands.5 A massive exodus of wealth, talent and human energy occurred in 1585, when Spanish troops captured Antwerp. This action led to the blockade of the Scheldt River by the Dutch rebels, denying Antwerp access to the sea. Amsterdam, already a thriving commercial center, grew dramatically as Antwerp—the primary port and commercial center in the Low Countries—declined in importance and economic power.6

When the Netherlands began its long struggle with the Hapsburg Empire it also disconnected itself from the Hapsburg commercial empire. Dutch merchants were forced to develop their own markets, and secure and maintain their own overseas trade routes. Although the United Provinces of the Netherlands were fighting for their independence from an oppressive tyrant, they were now also struggling for their economic survival.7

The Dutch responded to this challenge by establishing their own markets and trade routes from the New World to the Far East. Their search for salt to support the herring industry led them into the Caribbean where they clashed with Spanish interests along the coast of Venezuela. The loss of their access to the Portuguese spice trade in Indonesia—when Portugal united with Spain in 1580—led the Dutch
directly to the Far East where they quickly gained control of a large part of the spice markets. A major component in their ability to compete on such a large scale was the development of a new ship design near the end of the sixteenth century. Called a *fluyt* or flute, it was sturdily built and had a large cargo capacity. A simplified rigging allowed it to be sailed by a crew 50 percent smaller than ships of equal tonnage. It had a comparatively shallow draft allowing it to sail in 29½ feet of water. David Pietersz de Vries, who will appear later in this paper, would sail in nothing else but a flute given a choice. Interchangeable parts made it possible to turn flutes out quickly and economically by an assembly-line process. These parts could also be stockpiled at various repair facilities around the world. By sacrificing cannon for cargo space, however, the lightly armed vessels needed to sail in convoys protected by warships, otherwise they could be easy prey for pirates or other enemies of the Netherlands.⁸

By 1602 competition in the spice trade among Dutch interests alone had become so fierce that it led to formation of the VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) or East India Company. Chartered by the States General—the supreme ruling body of the United Provinces—it gave the competing cartels the opportunity to participate as shareholders in a monopoly. Rather than having many private interests competing with one another to everyone’s detriment, the VOC would fix prices by monopolistic control, maximizing profits to the benefit of all. Portuguese colonies in the Far East were soon under intense pressure from VOC fleets. By the mid-seventeenth century Portuguese trading interests in the Spice Islands, the Indonesian Archipelago, Ceylon, Formosa, and Japan had been replaced by the VOC.⁹

**New Netherland, or the Dutch in the New World**

Since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Ottoman Turks there had been a search for alternate routes to the riches of the East. Columbus’s famous voyage in 1492 was one of many unsuccessful attempts to circumvent the Turks. When the Portuguese explorer Vasco Da Gama rounded the tip of Africa in 1499 the East once again lay open to European trade. Although the Dutch were enjoying great success acquiring Portuguese possessions and establishing a commercial empire in the Far East, the trading fleets still had to pass through hostile waters. Heavily-armed ships reduced cargo space, decreasing profits; potential loss to hostile forces increased marine insurance premiums; armed convoys also ate away at profits. All of these
detrimental forces to successful trade drove both the English and the Dutch in the sixteenth century to find a northern route to the Far East. The lure of this theoretical route was driven by the ancient notion of symmetry in nature: if the world's land masses allowed for a southern route to China, there should also be a comparable northern route. English attempts to find a northern passage by Sir Martin Frobisher, John Davis et al., and the Dutch mariners such as Willem Barentsz and Jacob van Heemskerck all failed. It is in this context that Henry Hudson ended up sailing west while searching for the legendary northern route to the east.

In 1607 and 1608 Hudson made two northern voyages in the employ of the English Moscovy Company. Both failed to discover the "passage to Cathay." His experience and enthusiasm, however, attracted the attention of the VOC. Hudson was given command of the Dutch-built ship Halve Maen with instructions to sail northeast--more or less in the wake of Willem Barentsz--in search of the elusive northern passage. After encountering adverse weather conditions and dangerous ice floes his crew expressed a near-mutinous desire to sail in safer waters. Contrary to VOC instructions Hudson turned his ship about; heading: south by southwest.

When Henry Hudson sailed along the coast of North America from Delaware Bay to New York harbor in 1609 he was unaware that he was defining the limits of a Dutch colony in the New World. The VOC had hired Hudson to find yet another route to the East. One that was possibly shorter, and one that was certainly safer. Hudson failed to find the northern passage to Cathay but did succeed in opening an area of North America to the Dutch.

Shortly after Hudson's explorations various commercial operations in the Netherlands were licensed by the States General to trade with the natives in the major waterways from Maine to Virginia. One of the most active trader-explorers in these early years was Adriaen Courtseyn Block. Sailing for Lutheran merchants out of Amsterdam, Block made three voyages from 1611 to 1613. His base of operations in the New World was most likely the island off the coast of Rhode Island still carrying his name today. Other names of Dutch explorers also became associated with various landmarks, such as Cape May at the mouth of Delaware Bay, named after Cornelis Jacobsz May out of Hoorn. It is interesting to note that in the early years of fierce competition between merchant cartels in the Netherlands, certain areas may have become associated with the ships that frequented the area. In any case it is curious that two
placenames along the coast of Massachusetts--Vos Haven "Fox Harbor" and Craen Baij "Crane Bay"--coincide with the names of two ships --the Vos and the Craen--operating in the area in 1611-1612 under the command of Jan Cornelisz May, also out of Hoorn. These placenames are recorded on Block's "Figurative Map" of 1614. As risky as it may seem to make these associations since foxes and cranes could have been found all along the coast, it is not a coincidence that further north, approximately at the mouth of the Kennebunk River is the notation Het Schip de Schilpadde, "the ship the Turtle."

Block's initial voyage was apparently a follow up to Hudson's explorations. Whereas Hudson had approached Manhattan from the south, Block was attempting to find the entrance to Hudson's river by following the coast of New England. According to Johannes de Laet's reading of his journal, Block sailed into every river and stream from Cape Cod westward, indicating clearly that he had the specific intention to find the river discovered by Hudson, which he succeeded in doing.

By 1614 competition between traders had become so violent and bloody that the New Netherland Company was chartered as a monopoly to trade in the region in order to stabilize the situation. The first occurrence of the place name Nieuw Nederlant (New Netherland) is in a document of the States General concerning the licensing of traders on 11 October 1614. Under the terms of the Company trading cartels were permitted to finance four voyages within three years between the latitudes 40 and 45 degrees (from Barnegat Bay, New Jersey to Eastport, Maine). The main base of operations became Fort Nassau on the upper Hudson, 150 miles north of Manhattan Island. The fort was built on Castle Island, now mostly occupied by the port of Albany. It was 58 feet by 58 feet--interior dimensions, and was surrounded by a moat eight feet wide. The moat and breastworks protected a trading house 38 feet by 28 feet. Fort Nassau served as a focal point for trading activities in an area that was to become the most lucrative fur-trading operation in the Northeast.

Expeditions were sent from this post into the interior in search of mineral deposits and other natural resources to exploit. One such expedition in 1614 turned near disaster into a wealth of new and useful geographical information. Some time during the year a man named Kleyntie, accompanied by two compatriots, ventured westward into unexplored country, where they were captured by Indians and held for ransom. The following year they were rescued in the Delaware river valley by the Dutch trader Cornelis Hendricksen. Their adventures from Fort Nassau to point
of capture, either along the Schoharie watershed or near the source of the Delaware River, and their eventual ransoming in the Delaware Valley gave Kleyntie insights into the configurations of the various waterways within New Netherland. The map upon which Kleyntie’s expedition is reported shows awareness of the source of the South River (Delaware) extending far to the north into territory supplying furs to Fort Nassau. Dutch knowledge of the configuration of the various waterways within New Netherland is important for understanding later concerns regarding settlements on the three major river systems.

When the New Netherland Company’s charter expired in 1618, the territory was once again opened to cutthroat trading activities. As if to define the moment, Fort Nassau (Albany, N.Y.) was washed away by a spring freshet the year before forcing traders to operate seasonally from aboard ship or from tents on shore. During this period of unregulated trading several events occurred worthy of note here. The following incident in the Connecticut Valley was reported in a Dutch chronicle of contemporary events: "The Sickenanes are located to the north between the Brownists and the Hollanders. The chief of this nation recently made an agreement with Pieter Barentsz to trade with no one but him. Jaques Elekes had held him prisoner on his yacht in 1622. A large ransom had to be paid or he intended to cut off his head. He paid out one hundred forty fathoms of zeewan, which are small beads that they make themselves and value as jewels. For this reason he now trusts no one else but this one."

Assuming that the above report is accurate, this incident demonstrates that unscrupulous traders were employing brutal tactics to deprive the natives of zeewan or wampum. Jaques Elekes or Jacob Eelkens was also indirectly involved in another attempt to extort zeewan; possibly in the same year. In an interrogatory sworn before a notary it was revealed how Hans Jorisz Hontom had taken a Mohawk chief prisoner aboard his ship. After the ransom was paid (it was not noted whether zeewan or furs was demanded) Hontom cut out the male organs of the chief, causing his death. Jacob Eelkens was supercargo aboard Hontom’s ship. Although we do not know for certain whether Eelkens condoned this action, we do know that he had previously threatened to remove another part of a sachem’s anatomy in the Fresh River. Putting the brutality of these trading practices aside, it is important to note that already in 1622 the Dutch traders had recognized the value of the zeewan, which was being produced by the Pequots. If these two incidents occurred in the same
trading season of 1622, then it is quite likely that Hontom and Eelkens had been busy acquiring zewant from the Pequots to take up the Hudson for use in acquiring furs from the Mohawks.

Zewant became so essential in trading operations that it became known as "the source and mother of the whole beaver trade." The Dutch had developed the ideal trading relationship in New Netherland—an exchange of Pequot zewant for Mohawk furs. As with most ideal situations they are short lived; the English were on the doorstep and about to break and enter.

The chaotic situation created by private traders was not resolved until 1621 when the West India Company (WIC) was chartered as a trading monopoly similar in organization to the VOC. The WIC's area of operations extended from the west coast of Africa westward across the Atlantic and Pacific to the Indonesian archipelago. New Netherland was one of its many interests, which included the gold coast of Africa, Brazil with its wealth of sugar and dyewood, and the salt-rich Caribbean islands. Although the WIC was founded in June of 1621 it took almost two years for it to raise enough capital to finance its first attempt to take possession of its holdings in North America.

It is unclear when the first settlers arrived. According to Catelyntie Trico some set foot in New Netherland as early as 1623. Her deposition sworn out in 1688 states that she came over with Arien Jorissen Tienpont aboard the WIC ship de Eendracht or Unity. Trico, who was from Paris, came over with a group of Walloons. She deposed that she and three other women married at sea. Upon her arrival in New Netherland she was among eighteen families sent to the upper Hudson river valley. Two families and six men were sent to the Connecticut River, probably to the place called Kievits Hoeck (Saybroeck Point) at the mouth of the river on the western bank; and two families and eight men were sent to the Delaware River. While sailing upriver they stopped at the Esopus (present-day Kingston, NY) to lighten their load by making use of some boats that had been left there the previous year by private traders. Trico also states that eight men were left behind at New York, most likely Noten or Nut Island (present-day Governor's Island). Although it can be argued that her advanced age of 83 years may have clouded some of the details, her statement does accurately describe the early thinking of the WIC regarding settlements.

It is evident from Trico's deposition that the first colonists were to be distributed among the remote trading posts on the three major river systems in order to serve as agricultural support communities. Nut Island off the tip of Manhattan was to serve as a point
of assembly for transferring cargo from coastal-trading vessels to large ocean-going ships; a similar role played by the island of Texel in the Netherlands. In 1625 Willem Verhulst came over as director of New Netherland with instructions to strengthen the trading posts and their related settlements, but he was ordered to strengthen the post on High Island the most and to make it the center of the colony. It is unclear why the directors were drawn to this island in the Delaware River (present-day Burlington Island, near Burlington, NJ). It is possible that they had been looking for a major trading center deep in Indian country but, unlike Fort Orange, ice free the year around. The directors had apparently been misinformed about the Delaware. In fact, one winter it was reported that Indians coming from the west had been able to cross over the river on the ice to the Dutch trading post on the eastern shore (Gloucester, NJ). In the end it was not the decision of poorly informed directors but an incident at Fort Orange on the upper Hudson that determined the location of the center of New Netherland.

Catelyntie Trico states that she lived at Fort Orange for three years but in 1626 returned to Manhattan. She does not indicate the reason for leaving her new home in the north; however, it is known that the local commander, Daniel van Crieckenbeeck, became involved in a war between the Mohawks and Mahicans in the spring of 1626. When he and six of his soldiers accompanied a Mahican war party for an attack on the Mohawks, they were ambushed a short distance from the fort and thoroughly defeated. Crieckenbeeck and three of his soldiers were killed together with many Mahicans. The Mohawks were outraged that the Dutch, who had instructions to remain neutral in such conflicts, would betray them in this manner. Fortunately Crieckenbeeck’s indiscretion coincided with the arrival of Peter Minuit as the new director of the colony. It was also fortunate that someone as reliable and trusted as Pieter Barentsz was available. He was the same trader who had gained the confidence of the Pequots after the incident with Jacob Eelkens in 1622.

Barentsz was immediately dispatched to Mohawk country to discuss the unfortunate incident at Fort Orange. He was able to convince the Mohawks that it had been an unauthorized initiative on Crieckenbeeck’s part and assured them that it would not happen again. Upon hearing the news of the disaster Minuit sailed immediately to Fort Orange. He had been in the colony the previous year as a volunteer with the assignment of exploring New Netherland from one end to the other for precious metals and other marketable resources. Minuit
knew the land and the various Native Americans better than anyone else in the colony at that time. He saw the dangers in the situation and realized that the outlying support communities were in peril of destruction. Minuit resolved the problem by purchasing Manhattan Island for 60 guilders worth of trade goods and moving all the outlying families to this central location. Apparently the Mohawks agreed with Barentsz to allow trading personnel to remain at Fort Orange but insisted that the families be removed; or they may have indicated that they could no longer guarantee the settlers' safety. At this time even the families from the Connecticut River and High Island were withdrawn. Instead of retaining a presence at the post on High Island, it was moved to a new location on the eastern shore of the Delaware River (present-day Gloucester, NJ). The new trading post was christened Fort Nassau.

The Dutch on the Versche Rivier

The Fresh River post was at this time probably at the mouth of the river at Kievit's Hoeck. Catelyntie states that in 1623 as soon as they reached Manhattan aboard the ship Eendracht, two families and six men were sent to the "Harford River." Although the families were withdrawn to Manhattan after the Crieckenbeeck incident, the six men were probably kept at the post in order to maintain a trading presence. Seven years later events in the Connecticut Valley made it possible if not necessary for the Dutch to move their post upriver into the interior. However, the Dutch were not satisfied to possess land by right of discovery. A case in point is the Fresh River region of New Netherland or western Connecticut. Although the WIC could claim proprietary interest in the land north of Long Island because of Block's explorations, the Dutch sought out the "rightful owners" in order to possess it with legal documentation.

The sequence of events preceding the purchase is told in a report associated with the resolution of the First Anglo-Dutch war in 1654. Because the report is published in Dutch in a rare book I will offer here a translation of its contents, both to demonstrate how the Dutch understood their claim to the land, and to make the information available to historians. The report was probably submitted by Petrus Stuyvesant, director general of New Netherland, in order to provide background information for the Dutch claim to the Connecticut Valley. In 1654 negotiations were still under way concerning the ratification of the Hartford Treaty; any information concerning Dutch rights to the area would have been crucial to the Dutch negotiators.
The report which is entitled "Description of the boundaries of New Netherland" reads as follows:

"In the year 1633, Wouter van Twiller, at that time director in New Netherland, purchased the land called Connittekock, situated on the Fresh River of New Netherland, long before any Christian nation had been there. Shortly after the purchase, payment and conveyance, this Van Twiller took possession of the land, and on behalf of the Company had the fort de Hoop built, which was continuously up to this date occupied by a garrison that also laid out a plantation and cultivated the soil.

"This aforesaid land, called Connittekock by the natives, is situated about 20 to 21 miles (one Dutch mile=2.8 English miles) up the river, lying in the jurisdiction of the chief Sequeen. This chief or sachem was in his time lord and rightful owner of the entire river and the lands around it. However, because a dispute arose over the jurisdiction and ownership of the aforesaid river between the chief of the Pequatoos called Meautiany, located on the east side of the Fresh River towards the sea side, and Sequeen, these aforesaid sachems or chiefs agreed to meet one another on the field of battle with their entire forces and to engage in combat, with the condition that the victor would remain, for himself and his successors, forever lord and rightful owner of the aforesaid Fresh River. After three separate battles in the open field, Meautiany, chief of the Pequatoos, held the field and was the victor; Sequeen was so beaten and defeated that he became the subject of the Pequatoos, and with the consent of the Pequatoos he placed himself and the rest of his people under the protection of the Netherlanders. For greater security, Sequeen and his people at Conhittekock went to live close by the fort De Hoop, which was also expressly stipulated in the sale of Connittekock. The son of the deceased Sequeen, called Sonquassen, still living (i.e., in 1654 when this report was submitted), would be able to attest to this.

"This land Connittekock was bought from the Pequatoos as victors, with the consent and at the pleasure of Sequeen, who, together with the aforesaid Meautiany, legally ceded the rights that he had to the honorable Company, so that the aforesaid lords directors received their rights to the lands and jurisdiction through voluntary conveyance and payment of the natives and rightful owners."
"Connettekock is situated on the west bank of the Fresh River. It is a very large and beautiful flatland, that daily (usually in the spring) like the Nile Valley is flooded by the rising of the river up to the hills extending along the aforesaid river, and then westward into the countryside.

"In the year 1635 a Mr. Picisen (John Pynchon at Springfield) built a trading post and plantation on the Fresh river above the aforesaid fort De Hoop, against which Director Twiller protested on behalf of the Company through a certain Andries Hudden.

"The English, persisting anyway, established a fort named the Tamhert and other villages on ground and land purchased by the Company just a small cannon's shot away from the fort De Hoop, contrary to continuous protests; also, so that the English of Hertfort, left hardly enough land to supply the grain and vegetables necessary for the people at the fort De Hoop; of those lands they robbed the Company by force, contrary to all public law.

"Fearing that they might suffer some adverse consequences in the future from the aforesaid proceedings, the English of Hertfort dispatched three deputies to negotiate with the director of New Netherland, for which purpose they submitted some written points, which points they were to send to the Governor of Hertfort for ratification; to date this has not happened, and the dispute remains as before."

For the first five years the Company supplied New Netherland only with enough settlers to develop agricultural support farms at the various trading posts, and later on Manhattan. Although there was a genuine fear among certain directors that colonization would adversely effect profits, it is also the case that the Company was concentrating most of its attention on Africa and Brazil. In 1624, shortly after capitalization was attained, the WIC sent an expedition of twenty-six ships and 3,300 men for the conquest of Bahia in Brazil; few resources were left for New Netherland. Initial gains in Bahia were soon reversed the following year by a Portuguese relief squadron; however, the market potential of Brazilian sugar was still the WIC’s main interest in the New World. The euphoria following Piet Heyn’s capture of the Spanish silver fleet in 1628 resulted in an even larger and more determined commitment toward the capture of Brazil; all to the detriment of New Netherland. Continued debate in the WIC concerning colonization
resulted in a concession called the "Freedoms and Exemptions." Rather than expend WIC capital the directors decided to privatize colonization.
The Privatization of Colonization

The patroonship plan of colonization allowed an investor or group of investors to negotiate with the natives for a tract of land upon which he was obligated to settle fifty colonists within four years at his own expense. In return the patroon was granted the rights of high, middle, and low jurisdiction, and held the land as perpetual fief of inheritance with the right to dispose of the colony by last will and testament. This scheme was in many ways similar to the Portuguese system of land development in Brazil, in which the crown granted to donatários (patroons) land called capitanias in return for colonizing and developing the region. Of all the patroonships registered, from Sable Island near Nova Scotia to the island of Fernando do Noronho in the South Atlantic only Rensselaerswijck on the upper Hudson experienced any degree of success. The rest either failed to be capitalized or were repurchased by the WIC. The anti-patroon faction among the directors was so hostile and suspicious of the system that there was little chance for its success.

During Minuit’s administration (1626-1631) furs began to flow back to the fatherland through the warehouses of New Amsterdam. Minuit saw the need to encourage colonization in order to protect the WIC interests from foreign encroachment. However, his promotion of the patroonships, especially Rensselaerswijck, embroiled him in constant conflict among Company personnel in New Netherland, and eventually led to his dismissal by the anti-patroon faction of the WIC. Minuit left a colony struggling for survival. The Company’s attention continued to be attracted to the potential of African gold, Brazilian sugar, and Caribbean salt. New Netherland was starving for financial and human resources. The single bright spot was the patroonship of Rensselaerswijck, which was showing signs of success despite attempts by the anti-patroons’ faction to sabotage all private interests in the colony.

The survival and success of Rensselaerswijck is as much a tribute to its founder and majority investor, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, as it is to its ideal location. Ever since Hudson visited the area in 1609, the plain on the west bank of the river (commanded by Fort Orange since 1624) was recognized as a critical location for the fur trade. The configuration of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers formed a natural conduit for moving furs from the west through the Mohawk Valley to a point approximately where Schenectady now stands. From there trade generally followed an overland route to the southeast, avoiding the Cohoes Falls near the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson rivers. From this
point the furs were traded for merchandise stocked at the fort and warehoused until ships took them south to Manhattan for transshipment to Europe. A patroonship located in this region would not only have the advantage of developing one of the most agriculturally productive regions in the Northeast but would also have a WIC fort in its geographical center for protection; the exchange of agricultural support for protection was the ideal situation envisioned by the pro-patroon faction among the WIC directors. Next to Manhattan it became the most important population center in the colony.

The only patroonship applied for in the Fresh River region of New Netherland was by Samuel Blommaert, a director of the West India Company. In his application for a patroonship in the Connecticut Valley he stated that it was his intention to establish a colony between the North River and the river of Siccamames (the Fresh or Connecticut River), and to christen the river Blommerts River (Van Laer 1908: 157). Unfortunately he was never able to raise the capital necessary to outfit the venture. Blommaert had become so disenchanted with the WIC opposition to systematic colonization that he was secretly plotting with Sweden to finance a colony in the Delaware. It is possible that a well-financed colony on the Fresh River could have been as successful as Rensselaerswijck on the upper Hudson had Blommaert not been distracted by his venture with the Swedes. In any case, Dutch presence on the Fresh River had to rely on the ability of the WIC to maintain a post that was attracting much English attention. Not only did Pynchon establish a trading post to the north, effectively cutting off the fur trade to the Dutch, but English settlers were also moving into establish agricultural communities.

The Killing of Tatobam

Problems with English settlers developed at about the same time that hostilities began between the Pequots and the Dutch. The incident that precipitated the hostilities involved the murder of Tatobem, sachem of the Pequot, presumably by Dutch traders. All the literature concerning the incident or relating to the murder assumes that the Dutch had committed the crime. Even the primary source material implicates the Dutch. However, after close examination of the surviving documentation, the case against the Dutch is not all that clear. First of all, the Indian side of the story is entirely filtered through English sources. The Indians speak to us only in the context of English interpretation of the events. In brief, the incident is generally related as follows: Tatobem is lured aboard a
trading vessel in the Connecticut River where he is isolated and held for ransom. After a bushel of wampum is paid, Tatobem is killed and returned to his people. Secondary sources invariably state that the traders responsible were Dutch; one goes so far as to state flatly that it was done by officials at Fort Hope to repay the Pequots for an earlier incident.

Most references to Tatobem’s death are drawn basically from two contemporary sources: John Underhill’s relation of the Pequot war and John Winthrop’s journal. Both are related in the context of explaining the death of John Stone, an Englishman who was killed by Pequots together with his crew of eight in retaliation for the killing of their sachem Tatobem. While Underhill describes in some detail the death of Tatobem without offering any cause but greed; Winthrop elaborates on the cause without giving any details of his death. The two accounts when taken together reveal some troubling inconsistencies. Underhill indirectly quotes the Indians excuse for killing Stone by saying that "not long before the comming of these English (Stone and his crew) into the River, there was a certaine vessel that came to us in way of trade, we used them well, and traded with them, and tooke them to be such as would wrong us in the least matter; but our Sachem or Prince comming aboord, they laid a plot how they might destroy him, which plot discovereth it selfe by the event, as followeth: they keeping their boat aboord, and not desirous of our company, gave us leave to stand hollowing ashore, that they might worke their mischievous plot: but as wee stood they called to us, and demanded of us a bushell of Wampam-Peke, which is their money, this they demanded for his ransome, this peale did ring terribly in our eares, to demand so much for the life of our Prince, whome we thought was in the hands of honest men, and wee had never wronged them; but we saw there was not remedy their expectation must be granted, or else they would not send him ashore, which they promised they would doe, if wee would answer their desires: wee sent them so much aboord according to demand, and they according their promis sent him ashore, but first slew him, this much exasperated our spirits, and made us vow a revenge; suddenly after came these Captaines with a vessel into the River, and pretended to trade with us as the former did."

The captains were Stone and Norton with a crew of seven. Pequot Indians boarded the ship ostensibly to begin trade negotiations. One of the Indian traders happened to be Sassacus, the son of Tatobem. When Stone passed out from drink in his cabin, Sassacus knocked him in the head. As the Indians fled ashore the ship blew up killing the remaining crew members. During subsequent negotiations concerning the incident, the
Indian ambassadors claimed that they were avenging the death of their beloved sachem Tatobem. They pleaded that they could not distinguish between Dutch and English and that it was all an honest mistake.  

Winthrop’s account is concerned with broader issues. He explains that the reason why the Pequot now desired English friendship was “because they (the Pequots) were now in war with Naragansetts, whom, till this year, they had kept under, and likewise with the Dutch, who had killed their old sachem (presumably Tatobem) and some other of their men, for that the Pekods had killed some Indians, who came to trade with the Dutch at Connecticut; and, by these occasions, they could not trade safely any where.” These accounts of Underhill and Winthrop are usually conflated to produce the cause-effect scenario that the Pequots killed Indians coming to Fort Hope in violation of the Dutch open trade agreement, for which the Dutch retaliated by killing Tatobem, causing the Pequots to avenge the death of their chief by killing Stone and his crew. The problem with this neat sequence of events is: why would Tatobem board a Dutch ship, knowing that he had just angered the Dutch at Fort Hope and probably had a price on his head? According to Underhill the Pequots thought that their sachem was “in the hands of honest men, and wee had never wronged them.” It is doubtful that a man of Tatobem’s experience and wisdom would have made such a mistake. Remember, he had already been through such an ordeal some twelve years earlier at the hands of Jaques Eelkens.

Then, who did kill Tatobem? Could it be that he had once again fallen into the hands of Jaques Eelkens? The modus operandi of holding a sachem for ransom is the same. The confusion over nationality could stem from Eelkens switch of allegiance to the English flag. Shortly after the 1622 incident with Tatobem, Eelkens fell into disfavor with the Dutch. In 1633 he appeared before Fort Amsterdam as supercargo of the English ship William. After Eelkens was expelled from the Hudson River for attempting to trade illegally near Fort Orange, he sailed in June through Hellgate into Long Island Sound. On his voyage back to England he traded along the coast of Connecticut. During this time he would have had ample opportunity to be in the Fresh River for a confrontation with Tatobem. The Pequot sachem would have felt safe boarding a ship flying the English flag; unaware that he was again falling into the hands of an old foe. Recall of and anger over the previous incident may have led to his death this time. If Tatobem’s compatriots were able to find out that the ship was skippered by Eelkens, they would have assumed that the Dutch were involved. Thus the often quoted claim that Tatobem was killed by the Dutch is true.
because Eelkens was Dutch and had operated under the Dutch flag for years. This would explain why the Indians claimed confusion over distinguishing between Dutch and English. Stone could have been a victim of this confusion. Either the Indians responsible for his death thought that he was Dutch despite his English flag or, if he was flying a Dutch flag to gain an advantage, as many did, he still had put himself at peril. All of this, of course, is based on speculation. Whether Eelkens was the culprit or not still requires a smoking gun; however, the important point is that the murder of Tatobem was probably not the result of Dutch retaliation for violating their policy of open trade at Fort Hope, but rather the action of a trader using violent means to acquire zewant.31

Much of what we know about Dutch activities along the Fresh River comes from the journal of Pieter Davidsz de Vries. He was a highly-accomplished and decorated skipper and navigator, who had sailed to such exotic locations as Nova Zembla, above the Arctic Circle, and as far away as Indonesia. In his later years he became interested in establishing a patroonship in the New World. Swaenendael at the mouth of Delaware Bay failed when it was overrun by Indians in 1632. Vriessendael in New Jersey was also retarded because of the disastrous Indian policies of Director Kieft. As a merchant De Vries traveled throughout New Netherland and kept a detailed journal of what he saw. In 1639 Willem Kieft, director of New Netherland 1638-1647, sent De Vries on a diplomatic mission to Fort Hope. In order to stabilize relations with the rapidly growing English colonies to the north, it was necessary that some sort of a boundary agreement be worked that would satisfy all parties. On his way up the Fresh River he encountered some Native Americans whom he engaged in conversation. According to his journal of June 8th: "...having proceeded about a league up the river, we met, between two high steep points of land, some Indians in canoes, who had on English clothing, and among them was one who had on a bright red coat. I asked how he came by the coat. He had some time ago killed one Captain Stoon (Stone), with his crew, in a small bark, from whom he had obtained these clothes. This was the captain of whom I have before spoken in my first voyage to America, whose boat met with such a misfortune that his men ate each other; and he had now lost his own life by the Indians."32 De Vries had had a like encounter in the Delaware Valley several years before and had narrowly escaped a similar fate. This incident indicates De Vries’s comfortable relationship with Native Americans; not only did he seem to understand them as humans but
he also prided himself in being able to communicate with them in their own language.

The death of Stone and the failure of the Pequots to produce the murderers gave the English the excuse to attack. The devastation of the Pequot nation during this punitive war of 1636-37 was near complete. The Pequots were destroyed as a trading power. The monopoly held by the Pequots and the Dutch over the zewant trade was shattered. The English were in control and poised to take over the Connecticut River Valley.

De Vries’s mission to Governor Haynes of Hartford was unsuccessful, with the English claiming ultimately that possession was nine points of the law. On his return to Manhattan De Vries was surprised to see that the entire Dutch region between the Fresh River and Greenwich had been taken over by the English.

During the early years of Stuyvesant’s administration (1647-1664) the situation at Fort Hope had become untenable. The English continued to crowd in on the Dutch, ignoring Dutch protests and claims to the area. In the end it was the English policy of “might makes right” that prevailed. Faced with overwhelming odds in New England, the Dutch were forced to accommodate from a position of weakness. A hostile policy called the Navigation Act, which threatened the highly lucrative Dutch carrying trade, left little hope for a resolution favorable to the Dutch. In the end the Fresh River region of New Netherland was expendable. In order to secure the New England frontier a diplomatic solution was sought. The treaty of Hartford in 1650 promised a stable boundary with the English in the north, notwithstanding the compromise was mostly in Connecticut’s favor. Although the treaty was never ratified by the participating home countries, it did buy Stuyvesant time to strengthen New Netherland, making it a province with economic promise. Dutch involvement in the Fresh River region and their association with the Pequot nation, which held out such promise and potential in the early years, was soon to become but a memory.
Endnotes

1 The Dutch called the waterway de Versche Rivier, or the Fresh River; the English renamed it the Connecticut, which approximates the Algonquian name for Long River.

2 *Liever Turx dan Paus* “Better Turk than Papist” was the defiant slogan proclaimed by the Dutch rebels in the early years of the revolt. By indicating a preference for the Ottoman Turks—the archenemy of Christendom—the Calvinist rebels were showing their contempt for the Catholic Hapsburgs.

3 During the Middle Ages, the Dutch developed a preservation method that gave them an advantage over competitors. By immediately gutting the herring and preserving them in a brine solution, Dutch herring boats could remain at sea longer in order to maximize their catches.

4 A popular quote proclaims: “God created the heavens and earth, and the Dutch created the Netherlands.” It can also be said that the Dutch created themselves as a distinct cultural entity. The distinctive Dutch character was forged in the crucible of common purpose and struggle caused by the eighty years’ war with Spain. See Simon Schama’s, *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987) for an analysis of the common elements that constitute Dutch culture. See also William Shetter’s *The Pillars of Society: Six Centuries of Civilization in the Netherlands* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

5 Originally there were seventeen provinces in the Low Countries; the seven breakaway provinces making up the United Provinces consisted in Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Groningen, Gelderland, and Overijssel. The remaining ten provinces stayed under Spanish control for the duration of the war and now make up what is the country of Belgium.


8 For an analysis of the Dutch shipbuilding industry, see Gerald A. de Weerdt, “Dutch Primacy in Shipbuilding: Another view on shipbuilding in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” *De Halve Maen*, Fall 1993. He speculates that Dutch supremacy in shipbuilding was due more to human attributes than design.

9 The VOC was formed as a joint-stock trading venture. Chartered by the States General of the Netherlands, the VOC had a trading monopoly from the Cape of Good Hope eastward to the Strait of Magellan; most of the world, except for the Atlantic region. It had the power to raise its own armies and navies, make alliances with local sovereigns within its sphere of operations, and, if necessary, had the power to make war and peace in defense of its interests. Company shares were traded on the Amsterdam stock exchange; investors represented a broad spectrum of society—from prosperous merchants to bar maids. Within one month of announcing its intentions, the VOC was able to raise six and one half million guilders in operating capital. The company was governed by a board of directors, seventeen in number, who represented the interests of the six chambers centered at Amsterdam, Middelburg, Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen. The monopoly was granted for 21 years and was an immediate success. For a history of the VOC, see Femme S. Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1991).

10 For a discussion of the classical concept of the shape of the world see A. Torayah Sharaf’s *A Short History of Geographical Discovery* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1967); see especially 32ff for Aristotle’s influence on geography.

11 Explorers were attracted to the idea of a northwest passage by such legends as *Fretum trium fratrum, per quod Lusitani ad Orientem et ad Indos et ad Moluccas navigare conati sunt* (Strait of
the Three brothers through which Portuguese attempted to sail to the Orient and the Indies and the Moluccas), which enticed navigators with the promise of a passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific at 40 degrees. See Samuel Eliot Morison’s *The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1971) for a discussion of the various explorations and tales surrounding the northwest passage. Willem Barentsz (after whom the Barents Sea is named) accompanied an expedition in 1596 to discover a passage along the northern coast of Siberia to the Far East. When the Dutch ship was frozen in the ice at Nova Zembla, Barentsz and his crew were forced to spend the winter there under extreme hardship. Barentsz died as he and the remainder of the crew were preparing to attempt a return to Europe. After more incredible adventures and hardship the crew eventually made its way back to Amsterdam to tell the tale. See *Reizen van Willem Barents, Jacob van Heemskerck, Jan Cornelisz Rijp en anderen naar het noorden* (1594-1597), edited by S. P. L’Honoré Naber, (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917) for the journal kept by Gerrit de Veer, a survivor of Barentsz’ crew.

12 See Daniel J. Boorstin’s *The Discoverers: A History of Man’s Search to Know His World and Himself* (New York: Random House, 1983) for an interpretation of the age of exploration.

13 See *Henry Hudson’s Voyages from Purchas His Pilgrimes* by Samuel Purchas (originally printed in London, 1625; reprinted in facsimile form by Readex Microprint Corp., 1966) for the accounts of Hudson’s four voyages; and for a thorough analysis of Hudson’s service with the VOC see *Henry Hudson’s Reize onder Nederlandsche vlag van Amsterdam naar Nova Zembla, Amerika en terug naar Dartmouth in Engeland, 1609*. Edited by S. P. L’Honoré Naber, (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1921); and for a detailed analysis of Hudson’s four voyages consult Donald S. Johnson’s, *Charting the Sea of Darkness, The Four Voyages of Henry Hudson* (Camden, Maine, 1993).

14 Named by the Dutch *Roode Eylant*, “Red Island.”

15 The predominance of Dutch explorers and merchant capital associated with the city of Hoorn has given rise to a certain myth which deserves comment here. Just as the Dutch left their ships’ names and personal names behind on certain landmarks, they also resorted to their hometowns as an onomastic source. As stated Cape May was named after a Dutch skipper from Hoorn; many of the early visitors to the Delaware river valley were from Hoorn, including the famous David Pietersz de Vries. therefore, it should not be unusual to find Hoorn attached to some geographical configuration or waterway. Unfortunately the name lends itself to word play or puns. A waterway near Lewes, Delaware carried the name *Hoornkil*, on Swedish maps spelled *Hornkijhl*. In Dutch the name is pronounced with a transitional vowel between the *r* and *n* called an epenthetic or *Sproßvokal* in German. To an English sailor’s ear it would sound very close to the more appealing “whore.” As a consequence the folk etymology arose, with the often quoted explanation that the local Indian women were so ready to give themselves to the randy Dutch sailors that the area became known as the “Whorekill.” Not only is it improbable that the Indian women would be any more promiscuous in the Delaware Valley than elsewhere, but it is also unbelievable that strict Dutch Calvinists would allow such a name to be attached to an area that they frequented. More reasonable is the explanation that frustrated sailors used the name to play with; the pejorative meaning was reinforced by English insensitivity to foreign languages and promoted by them as the Whorekill, a name that applied to the area until it was renamed Lewes by more modest locals. Although this may seem far from our area of interest, it does relate because there was also a similar name attached to an island in the Connecticut river valley, which shows the same etymological origins as the Whorekill on Delaware Bay, i.e., deriving from Hoeren Eylant--again, named after the city in North Holland.


17 Fort Orange (located in present-day Albany) was built in 1624 by the West India Company.

18 Nicholaes van Wassenaer, *Historisch verhael alden ghedenck-weerdichste geschiedenisse, die hier en daer in Europa, als in Duysch-lant, Vranckryck, Enghelant, Spaengien, Hungaryen, Polen, Sevenberghen, Wallachien, Modavien, Turckyen en Neder-lant, van den beginne des jaer
1621... (tot Octobri des jaers 1632) voorgevallen syn. (Published in 21 semi-annual parts at Amsterdam), vol. 4, p. 39.


20 Direct quote comes from O’Callaghan’s History of New Netherland, 2:543 who cites “Albany Records” xviii, 85 as the source. The citation refers to Adriaen van der Kemp’s translation of the Dutch colonial manuscripts held in the New York Secretary of State’s office in the 19th century. The translation was never published but made accessible in manuscript form at the New York State Library. Historians generally refered to them as “Albany Records” because of their location and not their contents. They remained in Albany until the 1911 library fire in which they were destroyed.


23 Block Island off the coast of Connecticut and Rhode Island served the same function during the early years after Hudson’s explorations.

24 See Documents Relating to New Netherland, 1624-1626 (San Marino, California, 1924), for the instructions to Verhulst as director of New Netherland.

25 The Dutch chronicler, Wassenaer, offered the following description of the South River region, which may have been a common notion of the climate there, and may have been known to the WIC directors: “In the South Bay, some miles closer to Florida, it is a more temperate land. There is no winter there except in January--then only for a few days.” Wassenaer, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 146 verso.

26 O’Callaghan, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 50.

27 See Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America (Chapel Hill, 1975), p. 132 for a discussion of the concept of “possession” versus “right of discovery.”


30 Underhill, op. cit., pp. 10-12.

31 Manitou and Providence by Neal Salisbury (New York, 1982), offers another scenario. It states, without specific citation of source, that “In 1634, a group of them (Pequots) attacked and killed some Indians attempting to trade at The Hope. As protectors whose own position was in jeopardy, the Dutch retaliated. In one of the skirmishes that followed, they killed Tatobem and some of his followers.” This scenario is, of course, quite possible; however, it seems unusual that such a statement could be made without discrediting Underhill’s account or offering some substantial evidence to support the claim.


33 When Cromwell came to power in England in 1648 he sought ways to improve his country’s commercial interests around the world at the expense of the Dutch. His weapon was the
institution of a navigation act, which cut into the lucrative Dutch carrying trade. According to the act only English ships or ships of the country of origin were allowed to transport goods to England. Dutch success at sea depended on the principle of freedom to trade anywhere at sea without penalty. This act led to the first Anglo-Dutch war which lasted from 1652 to 1654.